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PREFACE
The purpose of this Handbook is to provide basic guidance in the
design of electronics equipment for the Jupiter Probe to ensure that it will
survive exposure to the Jovian radiation belts.
To those unfamiliar with the design of hardened electronics both
technical and non-technical hurdles must be overcome. Of the non-technical
hurdles the first is the unfamiliarity with.the radiation environment, units
of measure, and the nature of the effects in components. The second non-
technical hurdle is apprehension that a successful design can be realized.
We believe that successful.designs will be difficult but are possible for all
Probe experiments.
• The principal technical hurdle in hardened electronics design is the
scarcity of radiation effects data on components of interest. Radiation
effects in critical components are potentially a function of details of de-
vice geometry and processing steps during fabrication as well as electrical
bias conditions during radiation exposure. Thus, even published data on the
same component type may not accurately reflect those effects on the components
procured for system use.
The information presented in this Handbook is intended to supplement
the design process. Tutorial information has been minimized with references
to many excellent sources discussed in Section 1 of the Handbook.
Section 2 of the Handbook presents a general discussion of component
radiation effects and design considerations. Emphasis has been placed on
1
.presenting the scope of effects rather than an extensive compilation of
available data. Design considerations are suggested but it is expected that,
with knowledge of the basic component effects, individual design considerations
familiar to designers can be applied directly to realize hardened equipment.
The principal contribution of the Handbook is presented in Section
3: Hardness Assurance Guidelines. Step-by-step procedures are outlined to
support the evolution of design by establishing a component data base suffi-
cient to support and assure adequate survival. Input parameters are the
defined radiation environment, survival probability and failure criteria on
each component parameter. Analysis procedures are outlined to proceed based
on the determined element of risk, each leading to a component specification
for design and fabrication of hardened equipment.
In preparing this handbook we have attempted to foresee all the
radiation effects problems in Probe electronics and to recommend safe, but
useful, design rules for dealing with them. However, radiation tolerant
electronics design is not yet a mature discipline, particularly in the face
of rapidly evolving electronics device technologies. Therefore, it is
recommended that after the design has been accomplished according to this
handbook's rules, it be reviewed by experienced radiation-effects personnel
to ensure that there is no failure mode that was not anticipated in writing
the handbook, or that more recent radiation-response data on parts do not
invalidate the assumptions on statistical extrapolation.
SECTION 1
1.0 INTRODUCTION
1.1 PROBE OVERVIEW
1.1.1 Jupiter Probe Mission
The overall Jupiter Probe mission is the combination of an
orbiting spacecraft with an atmospheric probe to explore Jupiter, its atmo-
sphere, the surrounding physical environment, and its extensive satellite
system".1 The scientific objectives of the .probe are the measurement of
near-planet charged particle concentrations and the determination, of the
composition and physical properties of the atmosphere, the radiative energy
balance, and the location and structure of the clouds as the probe descends
to a depth equivalent to a pressure level of at least 10 atmospheres.
The probe mission profile is shown in Figure 1.1. An illustration
of the mission timeline is shown in Figure 1.2. It is expected that signifi-
cant changes will occur in the probe configuration during the Phase B studies,
but a first cut at placement of experiments within the probe would have the
appearance of Figure 1.3.
The mission is described in detail in "Mission Description Document
for Jupiter Orbiter Probe 1981/1982 Mission" - JPL #660-21.2
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1.1.2 Jovian Radiation Environment
Existence of intense Jovian radiation belts was confirmed by the
Pioneer 10 (1973) and 11 (1974) spacecraft. Subsequent analysis and modeling
of the belts indicated the potential for severe hazard to Jovian spacecraft.
Consequently, in order to define the impact on the probe mission and design
requirements, an analysis of the available radiation models and their impli-
cations for hazard to probe electronics was necessary.1
Analysis of the Jovian trapped radiation environment to determine
its impact on a Jupiter Probe mission has involved three distinct aspects:
Jovian environment definition for the magnetic field and trapped particles,
parametric analysis of the particle flux and fluence incident on the probe
over the trajectory range of interest, and a parametric shielding analysis
of the penetrating characteristics of the incident radiation. In this section
the magnetospheric modeling, trajectory analysis, and radiation transport -
analysis results are presented and discussed. These radiation environment
results then form the basis for the radiation hazard assessment of the
Jupiter Probe.
Discussion of the radiation environment is presented in this Hand-
book to generally identify the radiation levels of interest. The basic model
is defined from a nominal model of the Jovian radiation environment, and a
worst-case assessment of the radiation environment has yet to be finalized.
The uncertainties between the nominal model, as presented, and the worst-
case could be as great as a factor of five increase in the total dose of the
Probe ionizing radiation environment. Defnintion of the worst-case Jovian
radiation environment will be made available by NASA Ames Research Center in
separate documents.
TABLE 1.1: Electron and Proton Integral Fluence
Vs. Energy for Probe Entry at Best and Worst
Trajectories.
ENERGY
(MeV)
<io-4
ID'4
ID'3
ID'2
1C'1
1
3
20
35
50
80
100
INTEGRAL ELECTRON FLUENCE
2
e/cm > E
Best
1.65 x 1014
1.63 x 1013
1.58 x 1013
5.2 x 1012
1.2 x 1012
5.7 x 1011
8.3 x 1010
2.9 x 1010
1.48 x 1010
• -
3.90 x 109
Worst
1.55 x 1015
5.7 x 1013
5.6 x 1013
.
9.1 x 1012 '
1.8 x 1012
1.0 x 1012
1.7 x 1011
6.1 x l O 1 0
3.0 x 1010
-
7.6 x 109
INTEGRAL PROTON FLUENCE
P/cm2 > E
Best
2.5 x 1013
-
5.8 x 1012
4.5 x 1012
4.0 x 1012
6.2 x 1011
-
1 . 6 X 1 0 1 0
7.8 x 109
-
3.1 x 108
1.1 x 108
Worst
5.3 x
-
5.9 x
4.5 x
4.2 x
9.8 x
_
1.3 x
7.4 x
-
4.2 x
1.55
1013
1012
1012
1012
1011
1011
1010
109
x 109
NOTE: Best: Latitude =-5.5° South
Longitude = 57"
Worst: Latitude = + 2.3° North
Longitude = 313°
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Figure 1.4: Electron Integral Fluence vs Energy for 2 Trajectories3
Note: variations with entry trajectory do not necessarily
represent worst-case model of Jovian environment.
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Figure 1.5:
Energy in MeV
Proton Integral Fluence vs Energy for 2 Trajectories3
Note: variations with entry trajectory do not necessarily
represent worst-case model of Jovian environment.
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Figure 1.6: Probe Entry Sequence and Radiation Flux for
Distances -s 10 fi-
Data from both Pioneer 10 & 11 were used to obtain analytical
models for calculating fluence and dose values under various probe entry
conditions. Thus, once entry latitude, longitude (magnetic and geographical),
entry velocity, and entry flight path angle are specified, the model allows
one to calculate the electron and proton fluence and flux encountered by the
Probe.3 For illustrative purposes, we have calculated radiation environment
values for two probe trajectories chosen to be representative as best and
worst case examples. Table 1.1 shows the electron and proton fluences for
probe entry at
1) Latitude = -5.5° South
 D . ,,
' Best Case
Longitude = 57o
and 2) Latitude = +2.3° North
 Worst
Longitude =313°
Plots of these data are shown in Figures 1.4 and 1.5. According to the model,
described in Reference 3, the electron and proton flux are specified for L
greater than 1.1 radii, which is considered the altitude where the energetic
particle flux cutoff occurs. The flux of electrons and protons vs. distance
from Jupiter in units of Jupiter radius is shown in Figure 1.6. In terms
of the overall mission, the Jovian radiation environment is initially encoun-
tered far from probe separation (>, 20 Rj) and terminates (for the assumed
model) at about 1.1 Jovian radii.
The effect of these protons and electrons on electronic components
is determined by two factors:
1) the incident radiation is attenuated by material between
the affected component and the probe exterior.
12
and, 2) The relative effectiveness of electrons and protons of
various energies must be evaluated by a weighting function
for each damage mode. As discussed in Sections 1.2.1 and
1.2.2, the appropriate integrals over the radiation spectra
are the energy deposition, expressed as absorbed dose, D, in
rad(Si), and the displacement equivalent fluences, $ , for the
2 3
3 MeV equivalent electrons/cm and 4> for 20 MeV equivalent
fj — ^ U
protons/cm .
The effectiveness of overlaying materials can be measured by the
product of thickness and density, expressed in g/cm . Estimated shielding
thicknesses for a typical probe design are shown in Figure 1.7.
The first location chosen was inside the equipment bay, i.e.,
surrounded by the equipment coyer, and approximately in the center; the
second location was cho-sen as far away-from the equipment bay as possible
at the extreme aft edge inside the heat shield. Using the shield estimates
shown in Figure 1.7, we calculated the proton dose, electron dose, 20 MeV
equivalent proton fluence, and 3 MeV equivalent electron fluence, peak proton
dose rate and peak electron dose rate at each point; results are shown in
Table 1.2.
1.2 CRITICAL RADIATION EFFECTS
1.2.1 Long-term lonization Effects
• Most critical concern for probe electronics, particularly
MOS integrated circuits
• Environment defined by absorbed energy from electron and
proton exposures in units of rads(material)
13
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lonization effects are the consequences of radiation-induced events
in which electrons are separated from their parent atoms. The resultant free
charges are rapidly immobilized, but with persistent effects in the electronic
components. Molecular changes produced by ionization, generally classed as
radiation chemistry or chemical radiation effects, are not important for
the Probe environment. The effects of electronic charge trapped in insulating
layers in semiconductor devices is of critical importance for Probe applications.
The relative effectiveness for electrons and protons in producing
ionization effects is proportional to their energy deposition, generally
expressed in rad(material) units, where one rad corresponds to 100 ergs/gm
of energy deposited in the reference material.* The reference material of
most interest is silicon or silicon dioxide. For the Probe radiation en-
vironment there is no significant difference in rad(Si) and rad(SiCL), so
the former is generally used. The conversion of electrons and proton fluence
of various energy into rad(Si) is shown in Figure 1.8.
Long-term ionization effects in semiconductor devices are of
serious concern for the Probe. The energy levels of the electrons and pro-
tons in the Jovian radiation belts are easily high enough to penetrate
through the electronics; shielding to radiation levels of no concern would
require a prohibitive weight penalty.
There are two types of ionization effects in semiconductor devices:
1) generation of hole-electron pairs in the bulk semiconductor and 2) gen-
eration of hole-electron pairs in the silicon-dioxide passivation layer at
the surface of any modern device. In the former case, the generated carriers
* Another measure of an ionizing radiation environment is the Roentgen (R),
which represents ionization in air at standard temperature and pressure.
Since the effects of concern are the result of ionization in a component,
the use of units directly representing absorbed energy in the material
of interest (rad) is preferable to specification of the ionizing radiation
environment around the component.
16
cc.
o
CVJ
o
GO -r-
co
<TJ
S-
o
O CM
O
00
O
Q
_ '1 i : i LU4_ _*— . . -p > I Til
10
10-8
.01 .1 10
Figure 1.8: lonization Dose Conversion Factors for Protons and
Electrons.1*
17
are free to move through the semiconductor and the effect is transient in
nature causing no permanent performance degradation. On the other hand, holes
generated in the silicon-dioxide passivation layer are trapped and appear as
a permanent positive charge which can degrade device performance. The
distribution of this positive trapped charge in the oxide is a function of
the electrical bias on the oxide during radiation exposure. The density
of trapped charge in the oxide affects the degree of device parameter degra-
dation and requires consideration of bias conditions on the device during
the mission.
lonization effects are generally most severe in devices that de-
pend on the silicon surface characteristics. For example, in a p-channel
enhancement mode MOS transistor (PMOS), a negative gate potential produces
sufficient positive charge at the surface of the bulk silicon to invert the
n-type channel material to p-type and allow conduction between the p-type
source and drain regions. The addition of radiation-induced positive charge
in the gate oxide increases the potential required to invert the silicon
The threshold voltage is increased further by interface states created by
irradiation. The magnitude of AVT increases with increasing trapped
charge (i.e., radiation exposure).
If a positive gate-channel bias is established on the gate oxide
during radiation exposure, the positive trapped charge will accumulate near
the silicon-oxide interface. Conversely, a negative bias during exposure
will result in positive trapped charge near the oxide-metal interface. Thus,
the observed threshold-voltage shift will be substantially greater for
positive-gate bias" during irradiation than that observed for negative bias.
Effects in n-channel MOS transistor elements (NMOS) are a little
more complicated than those in p-channel devices. The effect of the oxide
charge is still a negative shift in the threshold-voltage which, in this
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case, reduces its magnitude. The effect of the interface states, however,
is a positive shift in threshold voltage. The net observed effect for a
typical n-channel enhancement MOS transistor is usually a decrease in the
magnitude of VT at low exposure levels, bringing the device toward deple-
tion-mode operation, with a subsequent increase in VT for larger radiation
exposure. This subsequent increase in VT , however, is generally observed
with a decrease in channel transconductance.
The magnitude of threshold-voltage shift in MOS transistors is a
strong function of device processing parameters. For highly susceptible
devices, a threshold-voltage shift of 0.5V may be observed at radiation
levels as low as 1 krad(Si). For hardened devices a radiation exposure of
greater than 1 Mrad(Si) is required for the same threshold-voltage shift.
The key processing parameters in determining hardness are the surface quality
of the starting silicon surface, purity of the gate oxide, and minimized thermal
stressing during all processing steps. Unfortunately, there are no electrical
parameter measurements on processed devices which would screen out unacceptable
parts. Required techniques at present are tight process controls and radiation
testing during device procurement.
Bipolar semiconductor devices and microcircuits are also susceptible
to long-term ionization effects but generally not to the same degree as MOS
devices and microcircuits. As in MOS devices, effects are the result of
positive trapped charge in the silicon passivation layer. In this case,
however, the basic effect is typically an increased rate of surface minority-
carrier recombination, which is observed as a degradation in transistor gain,
and an increase in junction leakage currents.
Because the affected element of transistor gain is surface recom-
bination, the overall gain degradation is most severe at low bias current
levels. Under low bias current, the gain in a bipolar transistor is deter-
mined principally by carrier recombination in the emitter-junction depletion
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region. Trapped positive charge in the oxide increases width of the depletion
region at the surface in the p-region of the device and causes an increase
in depiction-layer carrier recombination as well as bulk surface recombination.
Surface conditions are not as critical to high performance bipolar
transistor devices as was the case for MOS devices. As a result, those pro-
cessing parameters critical to long-term ionization effects are not con-
sistently controlled and there may be a wide variation in effect between
devices of the same functional type.
Variation in effect with applied bias during radiation exposure
is also significant for bipolar transistors. The worst-case is that of
reversed junction bias. Reverse bias on the emitter-base junction enhances
transistor gain degradation and reverse bias on the collector-base junction
enhances both collector leakage current and gain degradation.
• *
The worst-case for bipolar transistor operation is exposure with
both junctions reverse-biased, followed by operation at low bias currents
where the gain will be dominated by emitter-base depletion layer recombination.
Conversely, the best case would be exposure under high-current saturation
(both junctions forward biased) and operation at, or above, the bias current
corresponding to peak transistor gain.
Long-term ionization effects in microcircuits are the sum of
effects in the individual elements. MOS microcircuits are susceptible as a
result of the radiation-induced threshold voltage shift in the transistor
elements. Bipolar microcircuits are generally less susceptible than MOS ar-
rays, with their effects principally a result of transistor gain degradation.
The critical' radiation failure level for a microcircuit is a
function of the margin in the circuit design (e.g., excess transistor gain),
electrical bias during radiation exposure, and system performance requirements
(e.g., fan-out). At the low extreme in susceptibility are n-MOS dynamic
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random-access-memories (RAM) and high performance operational amplifiers
(OpAmp) that are seriously damaged at radiation levels of less than 10 rads(Si)
At the high extreme are high-speed, high-power digital TTL and ECL arrays
that perform at exposure levels greater than 10 rads(Si). For a given tech-
nology, microcircuits tend to become more susceptible with increases in
array complexity. _ ...
1.2.2 Displacement Effects
Serious, but not critical concern
Effects in silicon devices normalized to convenient
electron and proton energies
>Equivalent neutron damage effects defined to broad-
en available component data base
Displacement effects are the result of atoms being knocked out
of their normal positions in the crystal lattice. The important effects
appear as permanent damage, and the magnitude is a function of the inte-
grated radiation exposure. For the Probe radiation environment, displace-
ment effects are of concern only in semiconductor devices. The proton and
electron environments both contribute to displacement damage.
The relative effectiveness of protons and electrons of various
energies depends on the probability per unit path length for making a close
encounter with an atom, resulting in an energetic recoil, and the relative
effectiveness for creating permanent property changes as a function of re-
coil energy. Electrons and protons produce qualitatively different types
of damage. Electrons tend to produce simple defects with an efficiency
that depends sensitively on impurities present in the semiconductor before
irradiation. Protons tend to produce defect clusters whose effectiveness
is less dependent on subtleties in the starting material. The relative
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effectiveness for electrons of various energies producing displacement
damage in silicon has been studied theoretically and experimentally. Un-
fortunately, an accurate representation of the energy dependence of damage
depends on the specific material (e.g., type, resistivity). However, for pur-
poses of Probe design, a single relative damage curve can be used for sil-
icon without causing undue error. This curve, normalized to unity at an
electron energy of 3 MeV, is shown in Figure 1.9. Using this curve, any
arbitrary spectrum, such as the external fluence described in Section 1.1.2,
can be weighted and integrated to yield a fluence of 3 MeV electrons, $_,
*?
whose displacement damage effectiveness is the same (in silicon) as the
original spectrum. In a similar manner, the curve of relative effectiveness
of different energy protons, Figure 1.10, can be used to calculate the 20
MeV equivalent proton fluence, 3>. The normalization energies (3 MeV for
electrons, 20 MeV for protons) were chosen because with a typical spectrum
and thickness of overlaying material, the displacement-equivalent electron
fluence is near the fluence of electrons of energy greater than 3 MeV, and
similarly for protons of 20 MeV, but this rule is only approximate and does
not hold for different spectra and shields. The spectrum at the affected
silicon should be integrated over the damage curves, Figures 1.9 and 1.10,
to deduce reasonably accurate values of the damaging influence.
A large fraction of the existing experimental data on displacement
effects in semiconductors is for neutron irradiation. In this case, effects
are generally normalized to that of a monoenergetic 1 MeV equivalent fluence.
Thus, in evaluating experimental data, spectrum equivalences must be con-
sidered for both the proton and electrons of the Jovian environment and
experimental results obtained from terrestial simulators.
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The semiconductor material property that depends most sensitively
on displacement effects is the minority carrier lifetime (T). Therefore,
devices whose useful characteristics do not depend on T are insensitive
to displacement effects damage. For Probe applications, displacement effects
can be neglected entirely in MOS and JFET structures. The effect on bipolar
transistors increases with increasing base width; therefore high-frequency
transistors are less affected than low-frequency devices. Generally, the
high-speed logic structures, such as TTL, use geometries in which displacement
effects at Probe fluences are negligible. Displacement effects in rectifier
and switching diodes can be neglected unless their application can be de-
graded by very subtle property changes, such as V,-. Voltage regulator
diodes (VRD) ("Zeners") are often used in precision applications, in which
a small change in voltage O ImV) can be significant. Such changes can
occur, especially in the forward biased temperature-compensating diode that
is frequently encapsulated with the VRD in a precision device. Efficiency
of electro-optical transducers (LED, laser-diode, photo-diode,, photo-tran-
sistor, solar cell, photoconductive cell, etc;) are particularly dependent
on T, and therefore are likely to be the most sensitive to displacement
effects.
1.2.3 Transient Interference Effects
Significant only in low current detector circuits and
charge-storage microcircuits.
Ionizing radiation exposure can result in effects that interfere
with experiment performance, but disappear with the end of exposure with
no permanent damage. Ionizing radiation produces excess hole-electron pairs
in the bulk semiconductor of a device at a rate proportional to the absorbed
ionizing radiation dose rate. For silicon, this carrier generation rate, g,
is given as
25
13 •g = (4 x 10 ) D hole-electron pairs/second
•
where D is the absorbed ionizing dose rate in rads(Si)/s. For the particle
energies of the Jovian radiation belts that penetrate to the silicon device
chips, this carrier generation will be uniform throughout the bulk silicon
of the device.
The effects of this carrier generation are primarily in a diode
photoeffect at all p-n junctions. This photoeffect, just as in a solar
cell, produces an increase in reverse-bias current, a short-circuit photo-
current or an open-circuit photovoltage.
For the Probe mission, the expected worst-case ionizing radiation
dose rate is less than 100 rads(Si)/s which corresponds to a radiation-in-
duced carrier generation of 4 x 10 • -hole-electron-pairs/s. At this' radi-
ation level, the carrier generation rate is comparable to thermal carrier
generation rates at room temperature. In general then, transient inter-
ference effects will be negligible in semiconductor devices which have a
comfortable design margin at elevated temperature (e.g., 100°C). The most
critical semiconductor devices will be those that are critically dependent
on extremely low junction leakage currents, such as dynamic MOS logic cir-
cuits, semiconductor image sensors and charge-coupled circuits. The effect
in dynamic MOS logic circuits is an increase in the required refresh rate.
In image sensors and CCD's the effect will appear as an increase in the
dark current.
Transient interference effects may also be the result of ionization
effects in non-semiconductor materials. Charge emission from metallic surfaces
is on the order of 10~ A/cm -rad/s which would correspond to a worst-case
-11 2
of less than 10 A/cm for the probe mission. This could have an effect
in charge sensitive instruments and could result in electro-static charging
of electrically-isolated metallic surfaces.
26
Optical materials will also luminesce during irradiation, generally
re-emitting less than 1% of the absorbed energy in visible light. Sensors
sensitive to low light levels must deal with this radiation-induced background.
1.2.4 Radiation Survivability
The Probe will encounter the Jovian radiation environment
at approximately 20 R, and the exposure will persist to the upper limit of the
Jovian atmosphere at approximately 1.1 R.. In terms of the requirements on
most of the Probe electronics, the radiation exposure will be over before
operation is initiated. Unfortunately, however, the radiation exposure will
cause significant permanent degradation in the performance parameters of
critical electronic components. Displacement damage and long-term ionization
effects are the result of interactions between the high energy particles and
the bulk silicon and silicon passivation layer of the semiconductor devices.
The parameter degradation accumulates with radiation exposure. For some
critical semiconductor devices (such as MOS microcircuits) the degree of
radiation damage is a function of electrical bias during exposure. Because of
this bias dependence it is necessary to evaluate radiation effects under
bias conditions representative of system operation, but significant
parameter degradation can be expected for critical devices even under the
most favorable bias conditions.
Operational calibration of instruments before Probe entry may be
required while the Probe is still within the radiation environment. In this
case the instrument design must account for additional post-calibration
degradation in the critical electronic components and possible errors resulting
from transient interference effects during calibration.
In summary, the high-energy Jovian radiation environment will cause
significant performance degradation to critical semiconductor components
even under conditions of passive, or tumed-off operation during radiation
exposure.
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1.3 CRITICAL DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
The radiation environment for the JOP is essentially another set
of constraints on the normal design process. It is unique only in the un-
familiarity of many designers with the effects, and the relative scarcity of
adequate radiation-response data on components of interest.
The overall design objective of the Probe is for a high probability
of successful performance during an intense observation period following a long
dormant ride. In general, overall probe performance has the highest priority.
Failure of any experiment, for example, must be limited to that experiment
alone.
Acceptable performance of the Probe electronics in the radiation en-
vironment can be obtained by a proper combination of design considerations.
These include:
a) Device hardening by component and material selection.
b) Circuit hardening by making the circuit tolerant to ex-
pected changes in device parameters.
c) Taking advantage of the inherent shielding of the structure
and other electronic components by proper placing of
sensitive devices.
d) Deliberate shielding of sensitive devices.
It is important to apply quantitative estimates of the radiation-
induced changes in order to properly select the optimum trade-off between
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these different design options and to allocate the survivability budget
between the potentially soft components.
1.3.1 Component and Circuit Design Applications
The sensitivity of a given component to radiation depends
on the application. In general, radiation problems occur when a component
is used close to its limits in operating range or precision. Examples of
limits in operating range are very low p-n junction current densities, or
very close match between parameters of junction pairs.
For the JOP radiation environment, long-term ionization effects in
the surface layer of semiconductor devices are of prime importance, whereas
bulk displacement damage is of less importance. Surface ionization effects
produce leakage currents in semiconductor devices with back-biased junctions.
Bipolar transistors suffer degradation in dc gain, particularly at low current
levels. MOS devices are most likely to-become nonfunctional in an ionizing
radiation environment. Next most sensitive are the linear integrated cir-
cuits. Displacement damage is restricted to low-frequency bipolar devices
causing a decrease in gain (transistors) or efficiency (solar cells) . Table
1.3 shows types of devices affected by these environments.
The devices and materials of concern for long-term ionization are:
a) MOS structure (threshold voltage shift, enhanced leakage
in CMOS pairs).
b) Bipolar transistors (hpF degradation especially at low I.,),
and junction field effects transistors (JFETs) (enhanced
source-drain leakage current).
d) Quartz resonant crystals (frequency shifts).
e) Optical materials (coloration).
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TABLE 1.3: Radiation Sensitive Components
Long-term
lonization Displacement
Effects Effects
MOS Devices I V
Linear Bipolar IC's I III
Digital Bipolar IC's IV IV
I2L II II
Bipolar Transistors I III
JFET's and JFET Type Analog .
Switches III . ' V -
Electro-Optical Devices II II
Crystal Oscillators and Filters II V
Precision Voltage Regulator
Diodes III II
Other Diodes and Rectifiers IV IV
Optical Materials II V
SCR's, UJT's, Thyristors II I
Priorities:
I: Serious concern
II: Significant attention requred, no serious constraints
III: Some attention required
IV: Review only
V: No attention needed
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Displacement effects can affect the following devices and pro-
perties in the Probe electronics:
1) Bipolar transistors with low fT (hcp, Vrc , VRP ).1 ht LtSAT BtSAT
2) Precision voltage regulator (V2).
3) Light emitting diodes (LED) (light emitting efficiency).
4) Semiconductor photodetectors (sensitivity).
5) SCR's, UJT's, thyristors (turn-on sensitivity, holding
current).
The last radiation effect to consider is transient interference.
There are five types of transient interference in electronics at these low
dose rates:
a) Primary photocurrents in low current sensitive input
stages to the electronics. . .
b) Components extremely dependent on low junction leakage
currents such as dynamic MOS logic circuits and charge-
coupled devices.
c) Electron emission from cathodes of electron multiplier-
type detectors.
d) lonization-induced conductivity in photo-sensitive materials,
such as those in the VIDICON detector surface.
e) lonization-induced fluorescence in optical materials such as
detector windows and lenses.
Devices whose normal operating point is at currents in the yA range
or above will not be significantly affected by interference.
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1.3.2 Shielding Design
It is clear that moving from an unacceptable design condi-
tion requires increasing parts (circuits) capability and/or reducing the
radiation level at the parts locations. The latter effect can be obtained
by relocating sensitive parts to areas of greater inherent shielding or by
adding local shielding.
The addition of shielding can be used to reduce the radiation levels,
with a resulting increase in weight as a penalty. Figure 1.11 presents the
dose for the "worst" and "best" probe entry angles as a function of total
uniform shield thickness. A reasonably accurate calculation of the dose at
a device located inside a nonuniform shield geometry can be estimated by
dividing the 47T solid angle into segments within each of which the over-
laying material is approximately of constant thickness (in gm/.cm ). The
total dose is then calculated by summing the contribution from each solid
angle, attenuated as given in Figure l.-ll. An example is given in Table 1.4.
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Figure 1.11: Total Dose vs. Shielding
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TABLE 1.4: Example Calculation of Total Dose at an Arbitrary
Location within the Probe.
Shield Density
p(gm/cm )
0.60
1.00
3.60
6.80
9.6
TOTAL
Solid Angle Segment
(J1/4TT)
.33
.48
.02
.10
.07
DOSE = 6.2 x 104 rads
Dose per 4ir Segment
(rads)
8.7 x 104
6.5 x 104
3.3 x 104
1.4 x 104
8 x 103
Dose
(rads)
2.9 x 104
3.1 x 104
0.08 x 104
0.14 x 104
0.05 x 104
Assume t.hat for an arbitrary location inside the probe, an analysis
reveals the shield segments and solid angle factors shown in columns 1 § 2
of Table 1.4. From Figure 1.11 we obtain the dose for the amount of shield
material within each segment as shown in Column 3. The actual dose contributed
per segment is the product of Columns 2 § 3 and is shown in Column 4. Finally,
the total dose is the summation of each entry in Column 4 and is shown at the
bottom of Table 1.4.
By analyzing locations within the probe in this manner as shown in
Figure 1.12, it may be possible to add shielding in very limited amounts but
still obtain a significant reduction in total dose (locations defined on
Figure 1.7). Thus, from Table 1.4, entries 1 § 2 contribute over 95% of
the total dose but only involve about 81% of the 4ir solid angle. Clearly,
adding less than full spherical shielding can still obtain a considerable
effect. This kind of analysis should be performed for determining any
additional shielding.
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SECTION 2
2.0 COMPONENT RADIATION EFFECTS
In this section we will describe the three critical radiation ef-
fects (long-term ionization, displacement, and transient interference) in
various electronic and optical components. Care should be exercised when
using data shown in this section for design values since it represents a
cross-section of data available to date. Other similar devices may
be better or worse. The existing data will show how and by what
magnitude the effects may be expected. Functional dependence on
measurable parameters will be presented where they are known. Section
3 will provide methods to design systems and determine the actual
radiation hardness of the devices used in the systems.
2.1 BIPOLAR TRANSISTORS
2.1.1 Long-Term Ionization Effects
Bipolar Transistors - Long-Term Ionization Effects
- hpE decreases
- ^BO increases
- Noise (Current and Voltage) increase
The effects of long-term ionization on bipolar transistors are main-
ly in the degradation of the common emitter current gain (hpE); particularly
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at low collector bias currents due to a radiation-induced increase in base
current (Ih). At the dose levels considered for this handbook, breakdown
voltage effects need not be considered and switching response is affected
only by the change in gain.
The decrease in common-emitter current gain, hFE, can be represented
at low doses by an increase in 1/hpp proportional to dose. After the change
is large (hp_ <20) the response may saturate or become superlinear, pro-
ducing catastrophic degradation of the device. Leakage current and noise in
the transistor (noise current and noise voltage) can increase due to
long-term ionization by more than 400% of their original pre-irradiation
values. Both NPN and PNP transistor types have similar effects on electrical
parameters with the differences being in the magnitude of the effects.
Figure 2.1 shows qualitatively how the gain changes with dose with
approximate dose levels for a general PNP transistor. Bipolar transistors .
degrade in gain due to long-term ionization more for the active state than
the passive state; the passive state transistor degrades more than transis-
tors in saturation. This is the result of :
greater radiation effect than forward bias.
reverse bias junction showing a
Since variations in manufacturing processes and device designs can
influence the gain degradation even for the same device type, conservative
estimates need to be made for design parameters.
Figure 2.2 presents data on the rate of degradation for a variety
of transistors as a function of collector current, !„. A first order
correction can be made by normalizing the collector current values to the
maximum hpF current (I ) . The decrease in damage rate with increasing
max
collector current is apparent in all devices. The dependence on I varies
between devices, but averages V^T~. For 150 krads, most devices fall
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Figure 2.2: Typical Long-Term lonization Effects in Several Types of
Bipolar Transistors from Various Manufacturers (A, B, C,
and D) Showing Wide Variations between Device Types.8
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below the line
Iog10 A(l/hpE) = -
where I is in yamps
-0.52
but a few devices exceed this line considerably. At present we don't know
of any means other than irradiation of samples from test lots of the devices
to predict which devices will have the larger response. Even the same de-
vice type will exhibit a different response when manufactured by different
vendors and even at different times by the same manufacturer. Both of these
cases are shown in Figure 2.3 for the 2N2222A transistor type.
(mean values on small samples)
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Figure 2.3: Typical Long-Term lonization Effects in 2N2222 Bipolar
Transistors from Two Manufacturers (A and B) Showing
Variation with Date Produced and between Manufacturers.8
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Figure 2.4 illustrates an attempt to establish worst case degradation rates
!'
from device specification data. There is reason to believe that for a given
passivation process, the rate of degradation will depend on junction break-
down voltage (BV , ), emitter current density, and base width in a manner
producing a linear relationship between the functions plotted in Figure
g
2.4. The extensive data taken by JPL for the MJS program are plotted. The
worst-case data show a strong superlinear dependence on BV , . Whether
this is a real dependence or the result of variations in composition of the
passivation-layer we cannot say. However, the evidence is clear that de-
gradation rates as large as
A D
max
10-4
ebo
have been .observed, where I -is the collector current, I
v C
is the
01
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o
10"
10"
10,-6
10"
10-8
max
SODJ= SoHlirn:lev1ced I
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
BREAKDOWN VOLTAGE - BVefao
8 9 10
Figure 2.4: Long-Term lonization Degradation Rates for NPN
Transistors Normalized for Emitter Current Density
Dependence. (3 MeV electron effects only).
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collector current at peak npc> anc^
Hz. For a device with £T = 108 Hz,
T
BVebo
is the gain-frequency product in
= 7V and I /I = .01, this
max
hcc would de-rncorresponds to A(l/hpE) = 3 x 10 D(rad). In other words,
crease to less than 10 at 3000 rad(Si). At this time it is not clear whether
the envelope of the highest points in Figure 2.4 can be used as a safe de-
sign criterion. It is clear that lower values of degradation rates cannot
be assumed without experimental data to substantiate them.
For leakage current (I-0o)» an initial sharp rise at low dosesLot)
is followed by a stable region over higher dose level. Both NPN and PNP
transistors show this same initial increase. Figure 2.5 is an example of
the Ir_0 increase that can be expected, although the increase is not large
enough to be worrisome in most applications.
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Figure 2.5: ICBQ vs. Irradiation Time.6
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Both PNP and NPN transistors show an increase in noise current and
noise voltage for dose levels down to 10 rad(Si). PNP transistors generally
degrade faster in noise at lower doses than NPN transistors. The noise
increase levels off at approximately 10 - 10 rad(Si) for both types. The
magnitude of change of the noise current-usually determines the change in
noise voltage. Tables 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 show some experimental data demon-
strating the possible magnitude of the effect.
The changes described depend on the device type, manufacturer, date
of production of the devices and the bias condition during irradiation. Each
can be the most important factor in any one case. The main factors which
control the changes in the electrical properties of bipolar transistors for
the long-term ionization effect are the build-up of trapped positive charge
in the oxide near the silicon surface and creation of surface states at the
silicon-silicon dioxide interface. The manufacturer's processing steps and
resultant oxide quality have therefore a major impact on the resultant radi-
* •
ation hardness. This is why two manufacturers supplying the same part type
can have such wide variations in radiation hardness between each other's
product, and even within a manufacturer's own product over a significant
length of time there can be large differences in radiation hardness.
The chip design of the device and the way it is used (bias condition)
is also a major factor in the hardness of a device. This is one area that
the system designer can control. As shown in Figure 2.4, there was quite
a spread of worst case data even for the same breakdown voltages.
Gain degradation from long-term ionization is known to depend on
bias conditions. Examples of the effect of bias in the active region of
the transistor is shown in Figures 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8; and compared with
the passive case.
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3TABLE 2.1 Noise Current Corner Frequency, f-, (Y) = f-i + Af, (y)
Device
Type
8883
2N5332
SN14021
X416S
X416L
A
B
C
D
E
f} (kHz)
Y = 0
12
10
5
5
0.7
0.49
0.87
0.13
4.2
0.2
^ (kHz)
Y = 105 Rad(Si)
3 0 - 3 8
9 - 32
7 - 1 9
5 - 1 0
1.0 - 0.8
0.71
1.27
1.4
11.2
1.97
^ (kHz)
Y = 1.1 X 106 Rad(Si)
79 - 94
40 - 56
24.4 - 26.5
17.5 - 38.4
2.5 - 2.3
2.3
3.2
6.4
48
9.1
f1 (kHz)
Y = 1.1 X 107 Rad(Si)
250 - 188
152 - 121
40 - 40
48 - 46
14.4 - 15.2
5.16
7.2
7.5
43
9.1
Note: Two numbers shown for the first 5 device types are values of f, obtained
by extrapolating from 100 Hz and 1000 Hz respectively. Accuracy of f,
determination is ±20% for the serial group devices.
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TABLE 2.2 Transistor Types in Parallel-Irradiation Group'
Device
Designation
8883
2N5332
X416S
X416L
SN14021
Type
PNP
PNP
PNP
PNP
PNP
hFE
52
51
42
35
40
Base Depth
(Na Lines)
< 5
< 5
< 5
< 5
< 5
Emi tter
Geometry
Stripe-
Stri pe
Stripe
Stri pe
Stri pe
Number of
Transistors
30
40
40
21
21
TABLE 2.3: Transistors in Serial-Irradiation Group
Device
Designation
A
B
C
D
E
Type
NPN
NPN
NPN
PNP
PNP
hFE
140
303
449
112
457
Base Depth
(Na Lines)
1
28
4
9
4
Emitter
Geometry
Stripe
Circle
Circle
Stripe
Stripe
Emitter
Area
(Mil2)
54
12.6
3.1
15
2.8
Emitter
Periphery
(Mils)
54
12.6
6.3
35
9.4
Number, of
Transistors
13
12
9
12
20
Note: Two type E units and one type C unit are on a single chip
parallel-irradiation devices differ from serial-irradiation devices by
the method of irradiation and measurement of noise figure. Parallel
refers to one exposure level - one measurement per device and no device
used again for the next higher radiation level while serial refers to
one group of devices subjected to higher and higher radiation levels
with measurements of noise figure taken between exposures.
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Figure 2.6: Device Current Gain vs. Gamma Dose for a PUP
Device with Oxide Passivation Irradiated
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Degradation.11
Low emitter (or collector) currents and high collector bias vol-
tages increase the gain degradation.6'10 Thus, for low base-emitter voltages
(VgE) corresponding to low emitter currents and for high collector-base
voltages (higher reverse bias) , the gain decreases faster with increasing
dose. As shown in Figure 2.9, I versus dose is also dependent on
bias conditions of the collector-base junction. More change in 1^,,.-. occurs
CBO
initially for collector-base bias than for a passive state; but the long
term total dose effect appears to be similar.
Additional insight into the gain degradation of bipolar transistors
is presented in an extensive JPL study of the 2N2222.12 Substantial samples
were obtained from several manufacturers and exposed under a variety of
bias conditions. Perhaps the most significant was the conclusion that al-
most all of the data could be collected in a log normal distribution with
a standard deviation of a factor of 1.8 in (l/hpE) . If we assume A(l/hpE)
is proportional to dose for sufficiently low doses, this corresponds to a
standard deviation in the failure dose distribution of a factor of 1.8 also.
(nA)
1.6
0.8
100 200 300 400 500
•3
Irradiation Time - min ( $ = 8.3 x 10 R/min )
Figure 2.9: ICBQ as a Function of Exposure Time for Various
Biases during Irradiation.6
2.1.2 Displacement Effects . .
Displacement effects produce long term degradation in semi-
conductor devices primarily by decreasing the minority-carrier lifetime. In
bipolar transistors, the principal result is a decrease in current gain
(hpE) although subtle changes in voltages (e.g., VB_, V ) can also
occur.
As discussed in Section 1.2.2, the displacement damage effective-
ness of a spectrum of particles can be related to a standard energy for each
particle type (e.g., 3 MeV for electrons, 20 MeV for protons, 1 MeV for
neutrons). With larger uncertainty they can also be converted from one
particle type to another as shown in Section 3.1.
Displacement damage induced degradation of h_E in bipolar tran-
sistors can be represented by the equation:
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1
 = 1 °-2 Kd *
hFE hFE £T
where hpF , and hpF are the gain before and after irradiation,
o
respectively, $ is the radiation fluence, f™ is the unity-gain
roll -off frequency, and K, is a damage constant derived from
minority-carrier damage:
1/T = 1/T + K . $
o d
The value of K, depends on the particle type and energy, on the resistivity
and injection level (e.g., emitter current density) of the semiconductor
material, and in some cases on the impurity type. Typical values of K,
- 8 - 7 2
at low injection levels are K, * 3 x.10 to 3 x 10 cm /sec for 3 MeV
• . >i o (\
electrons, K, * 10 to 10 cm /sec for 20 MeV protons and.. K, * 2 x 10"
__ dp - ..... „ dn
to 2 x 10 cm2/sec for 1 MeV neutrons.5
A few examples of proton- irradiation data are given in Reference
13. For example, the rate of degradation of a 2N1613 transistor irradiated
with the case removed with 20 MeV Protons at I = 10mA is given as:
= 3.5 x 10' cm
d
 (*20)
Given the nominal value of fT ^ 300 MHz for a 2N1613, this value corres-
-5 2ponds to K. ^ 5 x 10 cm /sec, which falls within the range given above.
There exist large quantities of neutron data. However, if we
combine worst-case proton and electron radiation levels with worst-case
damage conversion levels the equivalent neutron fluence becomes appreciable
49
for lower frequency devices. For example, using the factors from Reference
14 and the worst case fluence from Section 1.1.2,
*_ ^ 3 x 1012 e/cm2
O
S>20 *u 9 x 1010 p/cm2
$1 = 30 x 9 x 1010 + .06 x 3 x 1012 = 3 x 1012 n/cm2
Neutron irradiation data on the 2N1613 indicate at I = 10mA, A(l/hEP)/A$1 =
-15 -6^22.6 x 10 , or a damage constant of K, = 3 x 10 cm /sec. which again
1 *ffalls within the range of K, given above.
We can now use various data to derive worst case values for Al/hcc
" rb
for a transistor with f = 300 MHz (e.g., 2N1613) as follows:
-4 2 -3
a) For protons from K, <. 10 cm /sec, A(l/hpE) £ 7 x 10
b) For protons from Reference 13 data, A(l/hpE) = 3.5 x 10"
-7 2 -4
c) For electrons from K. <. 3 x 10 cm /sec, A(l/hp£) <_ 6 x 10
-5 2d) For neutron equivalent for K, <_ 2 x 10 cm /sec, A(l/hpE) <. .04
e) For neutron equivalent from Reference 14 neutron data,
A(l/hFE) <. 6 x 10~3
This example illustrates two important points:
1) The equivalent neutron fluence is dominated by the
assumed proton fluence. It decreases rapidly with extra
shielding, since the proton fluence is rapidly attenuated.
2) The equivalent neutron fluence is useful for comparing with
experimental neutron data (e.g., item e above) not for
calculation with worst-case damage constants (e.g., item
c above).
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It can be safely assumed that significant changes in saturation vol-
tages do not occur until the hnc has decreased markedly. For example,
12 2in Reference 13, on a 2N834 at $ _n = 3 x 10 protons/cm , AV = 10 mV,
P <11 2
whereas A(l/hcn) = .03. At $ 9n = 10 protons/cm , the AV < 1 mV.ft
It can be safely assumed that AVrt, < 10 mV as long as A(l/hpF) < .01.
LhSAT
If such changes are significant to a circuit application, test data on the
actual device should be sought.
It is recognized that variations of displacement effects occur within
a device type manufactured at a given time, with time of manufacture, and
between manufacturers. This subject has not been studied sufficiently to de-
rive confident conclusions. It is clear that the most important, but not the
only causal variable is the transistor base width, which can be controlled
by a screen on minimum value of f_. A study of transistors procured as JANTX
equivalent devices revealed variances over a period, of years corresponding
to a log-normal standard deviation of. up to a factor of 1.5, although the
distributions for most device types fell within a factor of 1.2.15
2.1.3 Transient Interference Effects
By calculating the carriers generated in a typical bipolar tran-
sistor for a dose rate of 100 rads(Si)/s using the expression found in
Section 1.2.3,
g = (4 x 1013) D = (4 x 1013) (102) s 4 x 1015 carriers/second
For a good transistor using standard packaging techniques, the
minority-carrier lifetime = T = 10~ .
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Therefore, the carriers available due to transient radiation =
5 x 10 x (10~ ) = 10 which is about the thermal generation rate in
silicon. The transient radiation effects appear to be no larger than the
normal leakage currents found in all bipolar transistors.
2.2 OTHER DISCRETE SEMICONDUCTOR COMPONENTS
2.2.1 Junction Field Effect Transistors (JFETs)
JFETs - Silicon - Long-Term lonization
increases
The two most common materials used in JFETs are Silicon (Si) and
Galium Arsenide (GaAs). Silicon has been the only material used until re-
cently in commercially available JFETs but GaAs is now becoming available.
Silicon will be emphasized since it represents the most mature'process and.
consequently the most reliable;.even though it may not have the best po-
tential electrical advantages of the two.
In the case of long-term ionization effects, standard silicon
JFETs develop increases in leakage currents (IGSS), especially in n-channel
devices. Any change in pinch-off voltage is not appreciable until dose
levels well above those considered in this handbook. Ircc can change as
ooo 4
much as an order of magnitude for dose levels down to 6 x 10 rad(Si). Table
2.4 gives some examples of the effects. Pinch-off voltage does not decrease
more than 50% until well above 10 rad(Si).16
For both silicon and GaAs JFETs, displacement effects are negligible
to levels beyond those considered in this handbook. Proton fluence effects
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on gm, I^gg and pinch-off voltage in JFETs do not become significant (i.e.,
> 1%) until >10U p/cm2 (20 MeV equivalent) for silicon6* 17>1(and * 1013 p/cm2
(20 MeV equivalent) for GaAs.16'19
Dose rates of < 10 rad(Si)/sec will produce excess leakage currents
_g
in cut-off JFET switches of < 10 A. This is negligible for most applications.
GaAs JFETs appear to be much less affected by long-term ionization
than Si devices. The limitation of these devices in the Jupiter Probe ap-
pears to be determined more by reliability due to the immaturity of the
technology.
TABLE 2.4: Behavior of IQSS of N-Channel JFETs20
Device Type
2N4093
2N4391
2N4391 (unscreened)
2N4392
2N4393
2N4856
2N5196
2N5520
2N5556
Gate Bias
During Irrad.
-20V
-20V
-20V
-20V
-20V
-20V
-10V
-10V
-15V
IKS <A)
Pre- irradiation
io-'°
icf10
ID'10
ID'10
ID'10
ID'11
5 x ID'11
5 X ID'11
ID"10
Post-60 krad(Si)
ID'9
3 x ID'10
9 x lO'10
ID'9
5 x 10" 9
4 x 10"9
7 x ID'1'
7 x ID'"
3 x ID'10
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2.2.2 Silicon Controlled Rectifiers (SCRs)
SCRs - Displacement & Long-term lonization
- Saturation voltage increases
- gate trigger current increases
The large base regions of the SCR require a long carrier lifetime
even at the relatively low JOP levels, displacement damage effects may cause
substantial performance degradation.
A typical SCR is sensitive to displacement damage at 10 p/cm
(20 MeV equivalent). The "on" voltage increases by as much as 50% (re-
sulting from the "on" resistance increasing); and the gain is significantly
reduced at this level. The effects are strongly dependent on the dopants
and dimensions used by each manufacturer.
For long-term ionization effects, the device is dependent on the
surface junction bias condition. The gate trigger current can increase
4 16by as much as 100% at 10 rad(Si) due to increased leakage; but since
the reverse biased junction is located in the bulk material and the surface
junction is forward biased, SCR long-term ionization effects on gain would
not be as great as for planar transistors.
2.2.3 Diodes
Diodes - Long-Term lonization and Displacement
- Zener voltage decreases slightly in precision
applications
The effect of the Probe environment on semiconductor diodes is at
most small changes in leakage current and forward voltage. Therefore, only
diodes used in precision applications need be considered.
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The breakdown voltage of voltage-regulator diodes (VRD), ("Zener
diodes") is a function of the semiconductor resistivity, which depends only
insensitively on displacement effects. However, temperature compensated
VRD's usually include a forward-biased diode in series with the reverse-
biased Zener or avalanche breakdown unit to accomplish a first-order can-
cellation of the temperature coefficient of breakdown voltage. The voltage
across the forward-biased diode has a dependence on minority-carrier lifetime,
and can produce a small shift in total voltage across the series combination.
The voltage in temperature compensated devices usually decreases
with displacement damage. The exact magnitude of the change depends on
the construction of the temperature compensating element, and does not de-
pend in a simple way on the rated breakdown voltage. It tends to increase
with increasing current, but this dependence is not useful since these de-
vices are temperature-compensated at only one value of current.
Electron irradiation data on a few VRD's has'been presented8indicating
that AV_/V < 0.3% at $_ = 3 x 1012 e/cm . Many devices exist in which
2 12 2AV < 2 mV at $_ = 3 x 10j~ e/cm . A proton fluence of $> = 10 proton/cm
(more than 10 times the Probe environment), produced only ^  1% changes in V . 8» l l f
1 "*) O
Neutron data indicate changes of AV /V <, 1.5% at 3> = 3 x 10 n/cm .16
L* Lf X
The changes in non-temperature-compensated devices are generally
smaller and may be positive rather than the negative change in temperature-
compensated VRD's.
Other types of diodes using heavily doped semiconductors (e.g.,
tunnel, microwave, avalanche) are essentially unaffected by the Probe
environment.
55
2.2.4 Electro-Optical Devices
Electro-Optical Devices - Displacement
• GaAs LED's - decreased output
• Si photodetectors - decreased sensitivity
• Optical isolators - decreased coupling
Electro-Optical Devices - Interference
• Increased dark current
This section discusses the displacement and ionizing effects on
semiconductor devices that measure or use optical information. The types
of devices to be discussed are:
- Silicon diode imaging sensors
• •
- photo conductor and photo voltaic detectors (infrared)
- silicon surface barrier detectors
- optical isolators
- GaAs and Si LEDs
- GaAs Laser Diodes
Within this general class of optical detectors and filters there
are multiple types of devices and materials available. The effects of
12 2protons on these devices and materials shows that in general above 10 p/cm
(20 MeV equivalent) the damage is severe except for infrared devices. In-
frared devices are very radiation resistant to proton fluence. For proton
11 2fluence below 10 p/cm , fewer types of these devices are affected (those
affected would include Silicon diode imaging sensors used in vidicon arrays
and silicon detectors), A summary of proton effects on several filters,
lenses and detectors is shown in the Table 2.5.
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From comparison of this data with other studies22~27the following
conclusions were drawn:
a) HgCdTe and PbS detectors (infrared) showed little damage
or effects up to the level of concern in this handbook.
InSb detectors could be affected if they were photo-voltaic
11 " *5
rather than photoconductive27 but only at 10 p/cm or above.
b) Silicon detectors and silicon vidicons were very sensitive to
proton radiation.28
c) Infrared and visible region filters showed no effect (for
Silicon or Germanium).
d) Photomultipliers were extremely sensitive to interference.
The data currently available is insufficient to allow too many
generalizations on radiation effects. Most decisions will have to be made
by comparison with available examples.
Let us examine one of the semiconductor devices found to be most
sensitive; silicon vidicon. For the silicon diode imaging sensors (vidicon
type array application) the proton and electron fluence effects depend on
the temperature of the device.28 Figures 2.10 and 2.11 show how the dark
current and quantum efficiency can change due to proton and electron fluence.
The response of the silicon sensor is also dependent on the energy
of the particle (electron, proton, gamma, or X-ray) and its fluence. The
radiation effects for these high energy levels are summarized in Table 2.6.
The information is at room temperature conditions.
Photomultipliers appear to have no permanent damage due to either
displacement or ionization but are very susceptible to dose rates even as
low as considered for this handbook. A peak anode current of as much as
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Figure 2.10: Quantum Efficiency Versus Wavelength of Incident Light of an
Array Irradiated by 1 MeV Electrons and Arrays Irradiated by
11 MeV Electrons.28 Measurements at Temperatures of 300 °K and
217*.
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at 300 T< and 217*.
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10 amps can be generated by the 100 rad(Si)/s transient ionizing radiation.29
The interference effect in phototubes is due to luminescence of the window
and electron emission from the cathode and first dynode.
TABLE 2.6: Threshold Limits of Particle Fluence and Flux 28
Dark Current
Spectral Response
Glass Darkening
Cerenkov and
Fluorescence
Electron-Hole Pair
Current, and
Charging Effects
11 MeV
1012 e/cm2
3 x 1012 e/cm2
4 x 1012 e/cm2
8 22 x 10 e/cm -sec
6 ?3 x 10 e/cm -sec
' ' • • • . .
'
3 MeV
10 p/cm
1010 p/cm2
8 x 1010 p/cm2
6 24 x 10 p/cm -sec
6 x 104 p/cm2-sec
142 MeV
19 9
101. p/cnr
19 910 '* p/crr
1012 p/cm2
8 x 107 p/cm2-sec
fi 910 p/cm -sec
Another group~of devices to be discussed under optical devices is
the group using Gallium Arsenide (GaAs) for the bulk material. This group
includes light emitting diodes (LEDs), optical Isolators and Laser diodes.
The emission efficiency of GaAs LED's is significantly reduced by
electron and proton irradiation. The magnitude of the change depends on
the particular device. Figure 2.12 shows how much relative effect was found
in silicon amphoteric GaAs LEDs made by Texas Instruments.
Figure 2.13 presents data from electron irradiation of three types
ED's. The :
(25 MeV) is evident.
12 2
of GaAs L  large change produced by even 5 x 10 electrons/cm
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60,Figure 2.12: Light Intensity Degradation for Protons and Co
Gamma Radiation for GaAs LEDS.30
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Effects of Electron Irradiation on Light Output8
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Light Detectors (TIL601).
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Optical isolators are actually a combination of a GaAs LED and
either a photo-diode or photo-transistor. The isolators containing photo-
diodes were more radiation resistant than those containing photo-transistors.31
(This is mainly the result of having a more sensitive LED in the photo-tran-
sistor isolator). In the photo-diode isolator, the LED was the limiting
factor while the bias (VCE) on the photo-transistor determined whether
the LED was the limiting factor in the photo-transistor isolators. For
permanent damage due to displacement or long-term ionization, at low Vrp,L»t
the high input current of the LED will cause the LED to produce the major
portion of degradation. If low input current of the LED is used with high
Vrc on the photo-transistor, then the photo-transistor will be the limitingL*C
factor.
GaAs laser diodes do not appear to be sensitive to radiation fluences
of protons .discussed in this handbook.32This is especially true at low tem-
peratures and for currents significantly above threshold. '
Although solar cells are not used on the Probe for power, they
might be candidates for other photodetector applications. Displacement
damage in N-on-P cells is less than in P-on-N cells, but is still significant
at fluences of interest. Figure 2.14 illustrates typical damage rates for
a variety of particles.
2.3 INTEGRATED CIRCUITS
Characterization of radiation effects on microcircuits has become
a routine aspect of component qualification for hardened systems. As
microcircuit technology has evolved, complex MSI/LSI digital arrays have
been developed to supplement the single-function microcircuits as system
components. These complex arrays are the blend of semiconductor device
technology with the performance capability of digital subsystems. As a
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direct evolution of microcircuit technology there are many similarities
in radiation vulnerability between the simpler SSI (Small-Scale-Integration)
and MSI/LSI (Medium/Large-Scale-Integration) devices. There are also
however, unique aspects that critically distinguish MSI/LSI. These are
principally the technology, circuit performance, and radiation response
of the basic logic cells, as well as the requirement for evaluation of
overall array performance and radiation vulnerability assessment without
access to direct measurements on the internal logic cells.31*
The basic MSI/LSI logic cell, free from the constraints of external
loading and noise margin, has evolved into circuit realizations that have
little or no correspondence to a single-function microcircuit. This is
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illustrated most strongly by the development of memory cells of both bi-
polar and MOS memories, and in the logic cells of dynamic-logic MOS arrays.
With the evolution in the circuit realization of the basic logic cell, the
nature and critical failure levels must also change.
2
Results are presented on radiation effects of DTL, TTL, ECL, I L,
and Schottky-clamped TTL arrays of bipolar technology as well as the static
p-MOS, dynamic p-MOS, C/MOS, C/MOS/SOS, n-MOS and charge-coupled-device
arrays, focusing more on the nature of radiation effects rather than on the
levels of radiation hardness attainable.
Given the measured radiation vulnerability of the logic cells of
a digital subsystem, the subsystem vulnerability can be determined with
little difficulty, subject to a few confirming experiments at the overall
subsystem level. Application of MSI/LSI arrays as system components, how-
ever, makes a vital difference in the component characterization due to
the lack of access to the performance characteristics and radiation
vulnerability of the basic logic circuits (cells). This distinction might
seem fairly subtle, but it has a first-order impact on the experimental
characterization; particularly in the required analytical techniques and
mathematical models necessary to support the experimental study. Techniques
of simplified modeling and logic simulation, which are useful but not
necessary for small scale microcircuit study, become critical in support
of MSI/LSI experimental characterization.
Study of radiation effects on microcircuits has included the
measurement of transient photoresponse as a function of ionizing radiation
pulse width, as well as the permanent damage effects resulting from neutron/
electron exposure. Results indicate that the basic-radiation-induced
failure mechanisms in complex devices are essentially the same as those well
known for single-function digital microcircuits,3S>36 that is, 1) dis-
placement-induced gain degradation in bipolar transistor elements, 2) long-
term ionization-induced threshold voltage shift in MOS transistor elements,
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and 3) increase in the p-n junction thermal leakage currents. No significant
interference effects are expected in digital microcircuits. Potential inter-
ference effects may be expected in analog microcircuits with high-impedance
inputs at which AI < InA may affect circuit performance. Failure levels
observed are consistent with those expected from studies on basic semi-
conductor elements and microcircuits, but as reflected through the specific
logic cell technology and overall array performance characteristics.
2.3.1 Bipolar Digital
Bipolar Digital - Long-Term lonization and Displacement
2
- Slight fanout decrease in I L at low gate currents.
Radiation vulnerability of junction-isolated digital bipolar
arrays is generally similar for single-function microcircuits, MSI and LSI
arrays. Displacement-degradation effects observed in the bipolar LSI arrays
reflect the general evolution to high-speed transistors, with the corres-
ponding reduction in degradation. Gains obtained by the use of high-speed
transistor elements, however, can be offset by reducing the allowable margin
of gain variation in the cell design. Typical failure levels observed for
15 2the LSI arrays are $ % 10- n/cm indicating that, on balance, there has
been some natural hardening of the LSI devices in the process of evolution
from the single-function microcircuits. Clearly these levels are of no
concern in the Probe.
Bipolar digital devices have a long-term ionization effect threshold
4 7from 10 - 10 rads(Si) depending on the device type and the bias conditions
used during radiation exposure. Table 2.7 shows examples of several complex
devices and their levels of failure in radiation environments.
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TABLE 2.7: Complex Microcircuit Radiation Hardness Examples37
Technology
T2L/SC
I2L
T2L/SC
T2L
_
•TL/SC
Device
MMI6701D
T 1X0400
MMI6340D
IM5533A
AM2901
Displacement
Damage
(n/cm2)
1014 (Sink current)
5 x 10 (Sink current)
1014
> 10 (output gain
reduced)
Unknown
Long-Term
lonization
[rad(SI)]
«106 (Sink current)
«106 (Output
>106
>3 x 107
7
>2 x 10
levels)
ECL technology was tested and found to be functional at radiation
7 15 2levels greater than 3 x 10 rad(Si) and 10 n/cm . 38 An important exception
2
to this trend in bipolar microcircuits is I L. The use of lateral pnp and
inverted npn transistors in the basic logic cells substantially reduces the
' 2 ' ' 'basic displacement damage hardness. I L is a new and evolving technology,
however, and the radiation hardness is generally increasing with the tech-
nological maturing. It is expected that degradation may be observed at
10 n/cm in well designed arrays, damage will be substantial at 10 n/cm
and array performance at 10 n/cm cannot be expected. I L tests show
4 6
susceptibility levels in the range 6 x 10 to greater than 10 rads(Si) for
all device types at injection currents of 60 microamps per gate. Techniques
for hardness improvement by process control are known.39 The fanout required
also affects these levels significantly. For example, by changing the fan-
out from 6 to 2, the dose for failure increases by a factor of 10. The
2
worst-case for long-term ionization effects in I L arrays is operation at
4
minimum injection current. At 'exposure levels as low as 10 rads(Si),
significant increases in minimum current of operation have been observed.1*0
69
2.3.2 Bipolar Analog
Bipolar Analog
- large offset voltage increase
- large offset current increase
- loss in open-loop gain
- sink current decrease
OpAmps are particularly susceptible to surface effects because the
input transistors are frequently operated at low collector current to increase
the input impedance. Again the quality of the passivation layer controls the
response, rather than the design of the semiconductor circuit.
Experimental data using electron irradiation of 1974-1975 devices
to generate ionization effects indicate that 150 krad exposure of unhardened
OpAmps may produce large offset voltage changes, AV as shown in Figure
\Jj
2.15, and offset current changes AIQS as shown in Figure 2.16, and even
catastrophic failures. Hardened versions seem to be able to achieve AVnc
Uo
< 2 mV and AI_g < 1 nA. Effective hardening requires diffusion lot sampling
to check on oxide quality. Hardened LM108 are also compared to unhardened
LM108 in Figures 2.15 and 2.16.
Comparisons are also made for AIR as shown in Figure 2.17.
Similar effects occur in other linear microcircuits, many of
which incorporate some version of an OpAmp (e.g., voltage regulators).
Generally these circuits are less demanding than low current OpAmps.
Figures 2.15, 2.16, and 2.17 give several indications of the magni-
tude and variation among devices within a manufacturers product. The mean
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value of change for each parameter may stay within the allowable range for
the design but the variation among devices from the same manufacturer indi-
cate that the probability of obtaining at least one device that will have
a wide variation from the mean is high. Also the type of application has
an influence on the failure level. For the LM139 example, if the output is
off and the input is grounded, then latch-up to the positive supply voltage
occurs at radiation dose levels as low as 25 krads(Si). If the input is
kept at -130 mV then latch-up is prevented but the magnitude of variation
approaches 0.6 volts. The data also indicate the strongly nonlinear de-
pendence of parameter change on dose.
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The hardening of the LM108 improved the response of all parameters,
with slightly less success for !„.
Other manufacturers were also tested, showing as great or greater
variations. These variations can be related to the date of production and
not necessarily to the manufacturers (i.e., all manufacturers
are capable of producing soft and hard linear ICs). The behavior of the LM108
(hardened) shown in Figures 2.15 through 2.17 is comparable to the best
achieved.
Some specific examples of proton effects on bipolar linear circuits
are shown in Table 2.8.
TABLE 2.8: Proton Damage in OpAmps2
Device MeV P/cnr Effect
12HA-2-2500-2 (6) 20 l.SxTO * 7% loss of gain at 10
and 102 Hz, OK at 103
and 104 Hz.
12HA-2-2700-2 (7) 20 1.5x10^ 11% loss of gain at 10
Hz, 7% loss at 102 Hz,
loss at 10 Hz.
LM101AN 12(6) 20 1.5x10^ 9% loss of gain at 10
Hz, 11% loss at 102 Hz,
12% loss at 103 Hz.
The above data therefore shows a large dependence of linear cir-
cuits on long-term ionization effects but small changes in gain for proton
displacement damage.
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2.3.3 MOS
MOS - lonization
•critical total dose threshold voltage shifts
3 7
•failure levels from 10 to 10 rads(Si)
•critical dependence on bias during radiation
exposure
Long-term ionizing radiation effects on MOS microcircuits are
probably the most critical problem of the JOP electronic components. Be-
cause the radiation effects are determined by device parameters which do
not directly appear in electrical performance characteristics or reliability,
critical steps in processing are often uncontrolled. As a result there is
a tremendous variation in the long-term ionizing radiation susceptibility
of MOS microcircuits. Arrays can be obtained from today's technology with
failure levels that range from close to 10 rads(Si) to greater than- 10 rads(Si)
The basic radiation effect in all bulk silicon MOS arrays is the
radiation-induced shift in threshold voltage. Characteristically, the
threshold voltage of p-channel transistor elements increases monotonically
with radiation while the threshold voltage of the n-channel elements ini-
tially decreases to a point which may bring the enhancement device to the
undesired depletion mode, and then increases. Typical threshold voltage
shifts are shown in Figure 2.18. The cases shown as unhardened represent
effects observed in high-reliability commercial devices where the critical
parameters affecting the radiation hardness have not been controlled. In
hardened microcircuits, special attention has been paid to the quality of
the starting material, minimizing thermal stress at the gate silicon-silicon-
dioxide interface, cleanliness of the gate oxide from alkali impurities,
eliminating ionizing radiation exposure during processing steps such as
gate metallization, and elimination of high-temperature forming gas annealing.
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Hardened [i.e., failure levels greater than 10 rads(Si)] bulk CMOS arrays
have been successfully demonstrated by Sandia, RCA, Hughes Semiconductor,
and Rockwell International.
While it has been demonstrated that hardened MOS is realizable, the
additional process controls and modifications in logic cell layout rules are
not naturally compatible with the optimization of a high-performance minimum
cost LSI array designed principally for commercial applications. For example,
n-MOS dynamic random-access-memories are at the state-of-the-art in LSI
technology. To realize these complex arrays, clever logic cell designs are
used which use a minimum number of active elements, each one of which is
carefully controlled to operate at a minimum margin in variations in threshold
voltage, (typically less than 200 mV). This results in a complex array which
can be produced at high yield for restricted temperature ranges in operation
and with total ionizing dose failure levels between 1.7 x 10 and 3.5 x 10
rads(Si) for 4k dynamic random-access-memories.l*1 These results on the dynamic
4k memories probably represent the worst-case conditions of cell design and.
processing in which commercial processing goals are diametrically opposed to
radiation hardness. Unfortunately, this trend is continuing in the semiconductor
industry and application of commercial n-MOS LSI arrays (memories, controllers,
microprocessors, etc) in JOP electronics must be discouraged. When necessary,
these arrays must be considered among the most susceptible and critical
system components.
The long-term ionization radiation hardness of MOS arrays will tend
to decrease with increasing array complexity even for technologies adequate
for small/medium-scale logic arrays. Studies of an 8-bit CMOS microprocessor,1*2
for example, indicated a failure level of about 1 x 10 rads(Si) which was
about a factor of four less than that typical of the SSI/MSI microcircuits
of the same design and processing technology. These results are consistent
with the statistical variation in pre- and post-irradiation threshold voltages
as illustrated in Figure 2.19. These results as well as a thorough character-
ization of CMOS microcircuit radiation susceptibility are presented in the
JPL Radiation Design Criteria Handbook.8
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An additional critical consideration in long-term ionizing radiation
effects on MOS microcircuits is the variation in failure level with bias condi-
tions on the microcircuit during radiation exposure. From extensive studies
on individual transistor elements, maximum threshold voltage shift occurs
with a positive d-c bias gate-substrate for both p-channel and n-channel
transistors. This bias condition is generally most severe for p-channel de-
vices, but fortunately does not typically occur in most operating conditions.
Bias conditions which can lead to positive gate bias on the p-MOS elements are
found in CMOS arrays under unfavorable leakage current conditions in NOR gates
and in transmission gates.
In determining long-term ionizing radiation effects on MOS micro-
circuits the most severe operating condition is static bias during exposure,
but it is difficult to identify or control the bias conditions on each internal
transistor element. This uncertainty leads to some of the spread in experi-
mentally observed failure levels.
Operation of a microcircuit under clocked or dynamic operating bias
conditions significantly reduces the total dose failure level as illustrated
in Figure 2.20. The increased hardness is in part due to the time-dependent
variations between worst- and best-case bias conditions on the individual
transistor elements. If the array is to be used dynamically during radiation
exposure, experimental qualification under static bias conditions will pro-
bably lead to an unnecessarily harsh worst-case condition. Dynamic operation
of an MOS array following exposure under static bias conditions will not gain
any radiation hardness. If operation of the array is not required during
radiation exposure, the most favorable bias condition would be dynamic oper-
ation, or if the power dissipation required cannot be allowed, the next best
would be to insure that all power supply voltages are zero.
Additional technological development of MOS technology has lead to
the fabrication of arrays on insulating substrates (such as CMOS on sapphire).
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In terms of radiation effects, these arrays have all the susceptibility
mechanisms of arrays fabricated on bulk semiconductor substrate, plus the
addition of radiation-induced leakage paths at the interface between the
silicon and the sapphire substrate. The principal advantages of CMOS/SOS
over bulk CMOS are electrical switching speed, elimination of electrical
and high-intensity pulsed ionizing radiation-induced latch-up, and hardening
to high-intensity transient ionizing radiation-induced photoresponse effects.
For the JOP electronics the only relevant advantage is the increase in
electrical switching response with a trade-off required in the decrease in
radiation hardness. If required, CMOS/SOS arrays would be very critical
components in the system in limiting survival of the radiation environment.
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Displacement damage effects in MOS arrays of all variations and
technologies will be dominated by ionization effects for the JOP radiation
exposure.
Transient interference effects are of no concern for static MOS logic
arrays (that is, those that store data only in flip-flop cells). Dynamic
arrays (those that store data on p-n junction capacitors) will require an
increase in refresh data rate to insure reliable operation for applications
required performance during ionizing radiation exposure.
2.3.4 CCD's Image Sensors and Other Complex Types
CCD's - Long-Term Ionization
- charge transfer efficiency degraded
- reduction in dynamic range
CCD's - Interference
- increased leakage current
- refresh rate increase required
The recently developed charge-coupled devices (CCD's) have applica-
tions in optical imaging, signal processing and serial memories. There are
basically two approaches to CCD's: surface (SC) and buried (BC) channel.
A CCD is basically a string of MOS transistors which have the same general
reaction to radiation but since the mode of operation is different, the
CCD's are affected in a different way.1*3 CCD's are affected by the device
threshold shift and the increase of surface state densities (which affect
the threshold and transfer efficiency) due to ionizing radiation.
Considering displacement radiation, the main effects were bulk
crystal damage producing leakage current at a linear rate of about a factor
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of 6 for each decade increase in fluence for both types of CCD structures
BC
,12
(SC and ). This effect becomes significant around 10 n/cm to 10 n/cm .
Above 10""" n/cm the charge transfer efficiency is also significantly degraded.1*1*
Transient interference from continuous ionizing radiation will fill the wells
of a BC device in times ranging from 50 mseconds at 5 rad/sec to 5 mseconds
at 100 rad/sec.
The most serious degradation is the very large leakage current increase
and the resulting reductions in storage time and dynamic range. Also there
is an increase in noise. Wide variations were seen from device to device in
the charge transfer inefficiency changes. The limitations on leakage
current changes were such that at 10 rads(Si) they were too high to meet
the requirements on storage time, dynamic range and noise. The effects
from ionizing radiation are a strong function of gate oxide quality.
The only significant difference found between aluminum and poly-
silicon gates is a larger threshold voltage shift with polysilicon for long-
term ionization effects. Figures 2.21 to 2.25 show these effects.
10' 10 10"
Radiation Dose Rads (SI)
Figure 2.21: e vs Total Dose for 500 x 1 CCD.1*5
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2.3.5 Interference Effects
Transient interference effects on static logic microcircuits of
2bipolar and MOS technologies (i.e., TTL, S/C TTL, ECL, I L, p-MOS, n-MOS
and CMOS) are not significant at radiation dose rates below 10 rads(Si)/s,
and no problems are anticipated in JOP application. Transient interference
effects may, however, be of concern for dynamic arrays and charge-coupled
device arrays. The potential problem may be evaluated by determining the
total ionizing dose necessary to compromise the stored charge in the array
representing a single bit of information. This value has been reported as
low as 0.1 rad(Si) for a dynamic MOS shift register. At a peak exposure rate
of 100 rads(Si)/s it follows then that information in the CCD array must be
refreshed at least every millisecond and at least every 10 milliseconds for
the dynamic MOS array. These refresh times are only for the radiation-in-
duced carrier generation and must be reduced further for thermal carrier
generation. It is anticipated .that above room temperature, thermal carrier
generation will dominate for all but the highest performance arrays. An
example of the increase in required refresh rate i'n a dynamic MOS array is
presented in Table 2.9.
V
Hz
-0.2
4
200
Ik
4k
10k
40k
100k
Failure Level
rads(S1)/s
0.
1.
1.
4.
1.
3.
1.
3.
• 1
1 x 101 )
0 \
0 x 10J
8 x 103
6 x 104
8 x 104 j
6 x 105
8 x 105
>
Co60
Reactor
f
|
1
TABLE 2.9: I 1402 Dynamic MOS Shift Register Failure Level as a
Function of Refresh Frequency."6
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2.4 OPTICAL MATERIALS
Optical Materials - Long-Term lonization
- Coloration
Optical Materials - Interference
- Luminescence
Ionizing radiation produces color centers in optical materials
(glassy or crystalline). The rate at which color centers are produced
is a strong function of the material impurity content. As a general
rule the purest glasses are least sensitive to radiation-induced
coloration.
For reasonably Ipw optical absorption the effect of .radiation can
be described as an incremental absorption coefficient proportional to
radiation dose. For example, the transmissivity for light of wave length,
X, through a sample of thickness, x> is:
1 (A)
= exp [ -y(X)X]
where y(X) = yQ(X) + y'(A) D
and y'(.A) is the rate of change of y with dose, D, and has
units of cnf rad" .
Table 2.10 presents some typical values of y' over the visible spectrum for
1
*
7a variety of materials.  From theoretical consideration, a worst case value
-4 -1 -1
of y' - 5 x 10 cm rad can be deduced.
For internal Probe applications, D $ 10 rads, and the maximum
absorption for Suprasil 1, Corning 7940, or Suprasil Wl is less than 10
-1
-3
cm
TABLE 2.10: Absorption in Optical Materials"7
RELATIVE RATING
EXCELLENT
VERY GOOD
GOOD
MATERIAL
SUPRASIL 1
CORNING 7940
SUPRASIL Wl
POLYSTYRENE
AMERSIL TO-8
LEAD SILICATE (ORDINARY GLASS)
CORNING 5010 FIBER
p' (cm"1 rad"1)
-in% 10 u
.10"8
.10"8
% 3 x 10"8
,10"7
* 2 x 10"6
.10"5 .
For external optical elements the dose in the outermost layer can
be very large due to the deposition of lower energy protons. In effect the
absorption coefficient, y, can become very large, but only over a very
thin layer, x> °f tne outer material. This effect can be estimated from
the total energy fluence in low energy protons, which is 12 22 x 10 MeV/cm ,
The integral of the dose over the thickness of the absorption layer is then
4
"V- 3 x 10 rad-cm. This is equivalent in absorption to a material thickness
0.3 cm exposed to the internal dose of 10 rad.
Optical materials also luminesce when exposed to ionizing radiation.
The emission is generally broad spectrum, with some increase toward short
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wavelengths. The emission efficiency (light output energy per unit radiation
deposited energy) varies from a low value of M.0~ in pure materials to VIO
in less pure materials. With reasonable confidence we can assume that
luminescence efficiencies will be less than 1% in all materials except those
deliberately used as scintillators (e.g., Nal(TI), Pilot B plastic).
2.5 QUARTZ CRYSTAL OSCILLATORS AND FILTERS
Quartz Crystals - Long-Term lonization
Small frequency shifts
Ionizing radiation will produce very small changes in the resonant
frequency of quartz crystals. These changes can be significant if the crystals
are used in precise frequency applications.
Natural quartz, which is frequently used in high Q applications,
exhibits relatively large changes, as shown in Figure.2.26.
6
10J 10" 10s
Dose (rad (Si))
Figure 2.26: Composite Steady-State Frequency Shift Data vs
Dose for Quartz Crystal Resonators."8
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Even a dose as low as 10 rad(quartz) can produce a frequency shift of 0.1 ppm.
This problem can be overcome by using swept Z-growth synthetic premium - Q
quartz, in which the frequency shift at 10 rad(quartz) is less than 0.1 ppm.
For further improvement in response, we can make use of the observed
uniformity of radiation response over the central portion of a quartz bar from
which the oscillator crystals are cut. Figure 2.27 illustrates this uni-
formity.1*8 It can be used to select a bar with minimum response, and to correct
data for the known frequency shifts.
2.6 MISCELLANEOUS DEVICES AND MATERIALS
2.6.1 Surface Accoustic Wave Devices
These do not appear to be susceptible to change of any
parameters below 10 p/cm (20 MeV equivalent) displacement damage and
10 rad(Si) long-term ionization. •
2.6.2 Magnetic Bubble Domain Memories
Rare earth iron garnet films showed no significant changes
in saturation magnetization, wall energy, wall mobility, coercivity and
saturation velocity following neutron and gamma irradiation for levels
at least two orders of magnitude above those of concern for this handbook.
Therefore, no problem is expected for these device types.
2.6.3 Cabling
The Probe radiation environment will not produce any signi-
ficant permanent degradation in cabling and wiring.
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The wiring connecting low-current sensors to high impedance preamps
can possibly be subject to interference during radiation exposure. It can be
assumed that a current, I, is generated:
I = Kc D L
where K is a constant dependent on the wire and the radiation
spectrum, D is the instantaneous dose rate and L is the length
of irradiated wire.
-12The worst-case value of K is ^  5 x 10 Asec/rad-cm, corresponding to
the incident electrons all stopping in the insulator of ^  1 cm thickness
cable. In practice the actual value of K is smaller by a factor of 10-100,
depending on the degree to which the electron spectrum has been hardened by
intervening shielding.
2.6.4 Other Materials . •• .
For the Probe radiation environment, displacement effects can
be neglected in all materials except semiconductors.
Chemical radiation effects even in long-chain polymers, can also al-
most surely be neglected. If in doubt the following numerical estimate can
be performed. The most efficient radiation-chemistry processes produce a
reaction (one chemical bond change) for ^ 30eV of energy deposited. There-
fore, a dose of D(rad) produces a change in the fraction, f, of molecules;
f = 3 x 10"12(D)M
where M is the molecular weight. For example, if we expose
a long-chain polymer (Molecular weight ^ 10 ) to a dose of 105 rads a maximum
of 3% of the molecules will have a bond altered by the radiation.
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SECTION 3
3.0 DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR RADIATION EFFECTS
The first step in the design process is the selection of the gen-
eral types of components which are desireable for the system based on per-
formance characteristics under non-radiation conditions (i.e., a feasibility
design to make sure the system can be designed). Now, the system designer
must select the actual device types and specify modifications in the system
so that the system will survive the severe environments of temperature, ac-
celeration and radiation, among others. The following will provide the de-
signer with the necessary guidelines so that the system will satisfy the
radiation requirements of displacement effects, long-term ionization effects
and transient interference effects. Section 2 of this handbook provides the
designer with an overview of how radiation effects electronic system compo-
nents and materials, and an appreciation of which types of components and
effects are the most severe in the radiation environment.
The following sections show how to qualify devices for use in the
radiation-hardened system.
At the outset the system survivability budget in the Probe must
be known (0.99 probability of success for an experimental system is
an example). Next, the experimental system failure budget must be
broken down into the component failure budgets. This means that the types
of parts in the system are defined and the number of each type is determined.
Then a probability of successful operation must be defined for each type of
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component such that the overall system probability is satisfied (this will
probably require a reliability specialist to make the necessary breakdown
using established rules for general reliability).
The biggest failure budget should be given initially to the com-
ponents suspected of being most radiation sensitive as determined in
Section 2 of this handbook. If a worst case number for failure budgets
of component types is desired, take the system probability of failure
and divide by N, where N is given by the total number of components
in the system. Using this method, some devices will be easily qualified
while other device types, which will have a harder time meeting the
radiation requirements, could have used the added failure budget. A
small improvement can be effected by using redundancy. Generally,
the use of redundancy does not help to qualify a group of devices
by changing the survivability budget unless the group is close to
being qualified anyway; then a redundancy approach may be a viable
and quick technique to obtain the added margin.
In addition to the failure budget the designer must have a radiation
environment specified for the location of interest in the Probe. This
radiation environment is determined primarily by the electron fluence and
proton fluence and spectrum, as modified by the shielding between the external
environment and the location of interest, as well as the bremsstrahlung
generated in the shield. As a design input, however, the radiation environment
should be defined as a 20 MeV equivalent proton and a 3 MeV equivalent electron
fluence, which can be used for evaluating displacement damage effects, a total
ionizing radiation absorbed dose for evaluating of long-term ionization effects,
and a peak ionizing radiation absorbed dose rate for evaluating transient
interference effects. The radiation environment presented in this Handbook
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is based on the nominal model of the Jovian radiation environment and is
intended to represent the general range of the expected environment.
Definition of the uncertainties in the radiation model and worst-case levels
will be made available through NASA Ames Research Center. Uncertainties,
at present, could result in an increase in the radiation environment of up
to a factor of five from that as presented in the Handbook.
It is essential in efficient design that the radiation level must
be established as an input parameter of the design process. At that
point, the component evaluation, design techniques and hardening can be
implemented to realize a survivable and successful system.
In Section 3.1, we will present general design considerations that
should be used to select devices, materials, and operating conditions for
preliminary design. In Section 3.2 we present the statistical method for
treating radiation response data leading to requirements for hardness assur-
ance specifications on device procurement, where needed. In Section 3.3,
we present factors to be incorporated into the definition of radiation effects
tests on devices and subsystems.
3.1 DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
3.1.1 Bipolar Transistors
3.1.1.1 Displacement Effects
The most important parameter for displacement effects
is the proton fluence at the device with a relatively minor contribution
from the electron fluence. The shielding provided by Probe structure,
device placement, and the device case will in most instances make displacement
effects negligible. Therefore, the first step in estimating the displace-
ment effects contribution to bipolar transistor damage should be to make an
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estimate of the equivalence proton fluence, $„_ , and the equivalent
electron fluence, $, at the device. For this purpose, the first calcu-
12 2lation can use a worst case value of $ ^ 3 x 10 e/cm , but $2n should
be for the specific component location.
The first estimate of an upper limit to h_p degradation can then
be performed using the specified minimum value of fT:
A(l/hpED = ^- (Kp $2Q + Ke »3)
A(l/hpE) 4. ^ L (10-4 $2Q + 3 x 10"7 *3)
± do'4 $
 + io6)
If proton and electron data are available, they can be used to make a better
estimate. However, their variance must be taken into account, as in the
procedure discussed in Section 3.2.
If only neutron data are available, calculate an equivalent
neutron fluence:
* rk 30 $ + .06 $ = 3o$ + 2 x IO11
The worst case value of A(l/h) is then deduced by calculating XS±(-W + u^pE
at $ , using the methods of Section 3.2.
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If this value is not acceptable for required circuit performance,
the next step is to determine if the type of transistor, resistivity (from
BV . ) or injection level (from I ) allows a lower conversion factor from
proton/electron to neutron fluence.1*
If this result is still not acceptable, the available alternatives
are to relocate or shield the part, change the circuit requirements on
the part [i.e. tolerate the larger A(l/hpc)] or measure the proton/electron
response of a sample of the part population to be used.
3.1.1.2 Long-Term lonization Effects
There is no analytical form for long-term ionization
effects on bipolar transistor to relate gain degradation to electrical
parameters and a radiation damage constant:
* * • • • • • .
Similarly, the selection of.the device exhibiting minimum long-term
ionization response is "not governed by normal specifications. Evaluation
of these effects must be based on irradiation test data as discussed in
Section 3.2.
The use of the transistor in the circuit can minimize the degrada-
tion by providing adequate base current and operating the device at higher
collector currents (optimally near the maximum of the hpE vs. I curve).
3.1.2 Other Discrete Semiconductor Components
3.1.2.1 Junction - FETs
The increase in leakage current is strongly dependent
on the bias at the gate junction; higher negative gate bias on a n-channel
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evice causes greater change in leakage current.1*9 As with bipolar tran-
sistors, the designer has therefore some control over the resultant radi-
ation hardness level of the device type but the hardness level is
primarily dependent on the manufacturer's process.
3.1.2.2 SCRs
Performance degradation in SCR's is typically similar to
that of bipolar transistors of low f~ . This is particularly the case with
high voltage, high current devices. It is desirable to eliminate their
application in the Probe electronics unless critically necessary. No
analytical guidelines are available for either displacement damage or long-
term ionization effects. Device selection must be made from experimental
test data. Some parameter derating of gate turn-on and sustaining current
parameters is necessary, but the principal consideration should be in
device selection.
3.1.2.3 Diodes
For temperature-compensated voltage-regulator diodes it
can be assumed that
AV Z
VZ
< 1.5 x 10~12 $ + 1 x 10"15
and AVZ is generally negative.
If these changes are not tolerable, neutron-irradiation data on the
same device made by the same manufacturer can be used to establish limits for
proton damage, using an assumed ratio of 30 for neutron/proton fluence. For
confidence limits a population standard deviation of a factor of 1.5 should
be used, unless data are taken on the same date - code lots as used for manu-
facture.
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For other diode applications parameter changes are usually negligible.
If a sensitive application occurs (e.g., AVf < 100 mV), the applicable data
should be reviewed for the particular device type.
3.1.2.4 Electro-Optical Devices
The requirements on electro-optical devices depend very strongly
on their application. Selection of devices and applications should be
governed by the rules that semiconductor devices whose efficiency depends
on long carrier-recombination times (e.g., solar cells, LED's) will degrade
in efficiency. The application should provide adequate gain margin.
Vacuum tube photodetectors (e.g., electron multipliers) are undegraded
by the Probe exposure, but may exhibit an increase in dark current due to
transient interference.
An upper limit on interference effects can be estimated by -assuming
.the following:
1) PN junctions will produce a dark current of less than 5yA per
2
cm of junction area.
2) Cables, wiring, and circuit boards will produce a current of
less than 0.5 nA per cm of projected area that can couple
into a circuit.
3) The cathode of electron-emission devices (e.g., electron
-11 2
multipliers) will emit less than 10 A/cm of radiation
induced dark current.
4) Optical matierals will luminesce, emitting less than 1% of
the radiation energy deposited in them.
3.1.3 Integrated Circuits
Design parameter flexibility on microcircuits is generally more
limited than those of discrete circuit elements. For digital microcircuits,
selection of technological family and a maximum fan-out is then selected which
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determines the specific realization of a digital subsystem. Consider-
ations of required data processing rates also influence the selection of the
microcircuit family. Selection of TTL, Schottky-clamped, ECL, p-MOS or
n-MOS arrays fixes the trade-off between switching speed and power dissipation.
With CMOS or I L logic arrays, however, there is additional flexibility in
adjusting circuit bias conditions with a trade-off in power dissipation.
Generally, once the speed requirements can be satisfied the bias conditions
are established for minimum power dissipation. Adding radiation effects con-
sideration to the design will generally lead to a trade-off between radiation
hardness and power dissipation.
Design parameters of analog microcircuits are generally more exten-
sive than those of digital microcircuits. In many cases, overall circuit
parameters such as open-loop gain, input bias current, output drive capa-
bility and maximum slew rate are derated just as the parameters of a bipolar
transistor. Parameters of analog microcircuits that must be considered
most carefully are those that require matched performance of element pairs.
In this case bias conditions during application should also be matched as
close as possible to help the radiation-induced degradation in each element
match closely.
3.1.3.1 Bipolar Digital
decrease output fan-out
• increase I L injector bias current
In many cases, the radiation effects at the Probe exposure level will
be negligible. The critical design parameter which must be traded off to
gain hardness assurance is fan-out or output drive capability. Long-term
ionization and displacement damage effects may be significant in I L arrays.
In this case, the injector bias current can be increased to increase circuit
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hardness (up to the point where there are no additional increases in switching
speed with increasing bias current) at the penalty of increasing power dis-
sipation.
3.1.3.2 MOS
• decrease output drive requirements
• reduce maximum switching speed
• increase CMOS supply voltage
There are very few design parameters available to adjust the elec-
trical performance and radiation susceptibility of modern MOS microcircuits.
This is particularly true for p-MOS and n-MOS arrays that operate at fixed
supply voltages. Fan-out and drive capability is a critical parameter if
switching speed is a critical concern. Ionizing radiation-induced threshold
voltage shifts will reduce the output drive capability of p-type enhancement
mode transistors and will result in an increased switching time for a given
output capacitive load. As a design parameter, the capacitive loading on out-
puts should be minimized and the switching speed requirements should be
relaxed from the normal performance limits of the array.
The radiation susceptibility of MOS microcircuits may be varied
somewhat by the electrical bias conditions during exposure. The best case
is dynamic switching during exposure and the worst-case is positive gate-
substiate static bias. In general, however, hardening must be accomplished
by component selection and shielding. Hardened CMOS microcircuits have
been developed by a few semiconductor manufacturers through sophisticated
processing techniques and tight controls.
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3.1.3.3 Bipolar Analog
• derate open loop gain
• derate input offset voltages, currents
• derate output drive capability
• derate maximum slew rate
Design considerations in analog microcircuits are generally a required
derating in critical performance parameters. Radiation-induced effects are of
the nature to produce substantial degradation of these performance parameters
before catastrophic array failure is observed. Parameters involving cascaded
transistor gains and matched device performance are the most critical.
Applications of operational amplifiers in Probe electronics may require
increased feedback (or lower closed loop gains) to reduce performance sensi-
tivity to the degradation in open loop gain. If the total gain required
cannot be realized for the maximum closed loop gains which can be used,
additional amplifier stages must be added.
Degradation in the input offset parameters can be accommodated by
input circuit design to a point. If the required performance cannot be
achieved by circuit adjustment then additional circuitry is required to
implement a chopper-stabilized network.
Design considerations on complex analog microcircuits (e.g., A/D and D/A
converters) are more in derating overall performance as required for digital
microcircuits. Critical active networks such as high-gain, precision-balanced
amplifiers, are internal to the array and cannot be derated from the external
terminals. Critical parameters to be derated may include linearity, precision,
and maximum operating speed.
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3.1.3.4 CCD's and Image Sensors
• decrease data storage times
• derate for increased dark current
The basic failure mechanisms due to ionizing radiation effects in
CCD's and semiconductor image sensors are essentially the same as those of
MOS microcircuits (i.e., trapped charge at the silicon-silicon dioxide inter-
face) . Performance parameters, however, are much different and the levels of
complexity are at the limits of LSI technology. Critical performance
parameters are those directly affected by the threshold voltages of the trans-
fer elements, charge transfer losses, and recombination rates of stored charge,
Changes in threshold voltage will tend to cause loss of data during transfer.
Supply voltages can generally be adjusted over a limited range for modest
gains in array hardness. Increases in threshold voltage will also increase
switching times for internal transfer and for output drives. Maximum data
rates should be conservative and output capacitive drive requirements
should be minimized. .
Increases in dark current can be the result of threshold voltage
shifts and/or increase in carrier recombination due to displacement damage-
induced lifetime degradation. In either case there will be a decrease in
transfer efficiency and a decrease in the time that data can be stored in the
array. Little can be done about the transfer efficiency as a design consid-
eration but data loss can be accounted for by an increase in processing rate
(or a decrease in required storage time).
Conclusions to be drawn concerning the design features and operating
conditions of CCD's for total dose radiation environments are as follows:50
1) A buried channel structure should be used.
2) An n-channel structure should be used.
3) The design should use a planar channel insulator
(no stepped oxide) and only one type of electrode
material.
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4) The design must control the surface potential in
the region between electrodes.
5) The use of undoped polysilicon for interelectrode
4
isolation should be avoided. Total doses of 1 to 3 x 10
rads(Si) cause channeling in the isolation regions with
resulting deterioration in device performance.
6) The reverse bias applied to the buried channel must
be large enough to keep the channel depleted after
irradiation.
Devices incorporating these design characteristics have been oper-
ated with acceptable transfer efficiencies after exposure to gamma doses
, 4
greater than 10 rads(Si), compared to typical array failure between 10 -
105 rads(Si).
3.1.4 Miscellaneous Materials and Devices
3.1.4.1 Optical Materials
Wherever ultra-violet grade fused silica glasses are used
(e.g., Suprasil 1, Corning 7940, Suprasil Wl) the coloration from the ioniza-
tion dose will be negligible within the normal optical passband. If other
materials are used specific radiation test data should be sought in the
literature to establish that the resultant attenuation, exp[-uxj, is acceptable.
Antireflection coatings should be on the inside of optical lenses
(e.g., not exposed to the low-energy proton fluence) wherever possible.
Where it is necessary to expose them directly to the space environment a
radiation test with low energy particles to produce the anticipated outer
g
layer dose (^ 5 x 10 rad) should be performed unless data can be found.
The existing test data on MgF_ coatings appears promising, even at this high
dose, but the response can be a function of specific impurities.
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When optical glasses are viewed by sensors that may respond to low
levels of light, the effect of radiation-induced luminescence should be
estimated. The first step is to assume a worst case luminescence efficiency,
e ^ 10 . The signal expected from the detector, S, is:
c - in"5 £ R X D X M
o = J.U ~
4irr
where R is the response of the detector in output units
per W/cm of illumination,
D (rad/sec) is the dose rate at the glass,
M (gm) is the mass of irradiated glass,
and r (cm) is the distance from the glass to the detector.
_2
If S calculated with e ^  10 is negligible, we expect no luminescence
problems. If it is significant, the estimate should be repeated using
* *
.luminescence data on the specific material. If feasible, a particularly
useful hardening technique is to place an optical spectral filter in front
of the detector. Since the luminescence is broad band, its noise can be
effectively rejected compared to a narrow-band optical signal.
3.1.4.2 Quartz Crystal Oscillators and Filters
If frequency changes as large as 10 ppm are tolerable no
special provisions need to be made for quartz crystals. If they are not, but
a change of 0.1 ppm is acceptable, swept synthetic quartz should be used.
To ensure proper sweeping, a resonator made from a sample of the quartz
stone used should be irradiated and tested to check the response. If a
precision less than 0.1 ppm is required, a bar should be specially selected
and samples irradiated to characterize the response.
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3.1.4.3 Cabling
All cabling runs in which a background current of < InA
can be significant should be identified. For each of these the radiation in-
cident on the cable should be calculated and the interference current due to
electrons stopping in the cable insulator and conductors estimated. This
interference current should be added to the "primary photocurrent" generated
in the sensor and pre-amp input to evaluate the importance of interference.
Minimum photocurrents are observed in solid-dielectric, minimum-geometry
cables such as RG162.
If this current is unacceptable.it can be decreased by shielding,
shortening the cable run, balancing and subtraction, modulation/demodulation,
and other appropriate design techniques..
3.1.5 Interference
Interference is not treated statistically in Section 3.2,
because it can be eliminated from concern in all but a few cases. In
these it must be treated by special analysis and possibly testing.
In electronic circuit components interference can be neglected ex-
cept in the following cases:
1) Where a dark current of ^  InA is significant
2) In dynamic MOS memory array (e.g., MOS shift register)
3) In CCD arrays
4) In low level optical and radiation detectors
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3.2 COMPONENT SELECTION AND PROCUREMENT - STATISTICAL APPROACH
3.2.1 Introduction
The selection of components in a system is the most critical
part of the design consideration; a reliable system cannot be realized with
marginal components. The same generalization exists for radiation hardness
assurance. If radiation hard components are used in a system, little rede-
sign or shielding will be necessary. Usually, if there is a redesign, trade-
offs must be made and the system ends up only capable of doing a portion of
the intended task.
The following guidelines are designed to make the hardened design
process as straightforward as possible. The methods recommended are simply
an extension of good design techniques for the conditions of limited,
expensive component1data associated with hardened systems. By necessity of
assuring hardness, the steps taken to accept a group of components must
have checks on the assurance levels. To be 100% confident that a system
will operate in the Probe radiation environment is unrealizable; but it is
reasonable to achieve 90% confidence that a design is 99% reliable after
encountering a radiation environment.
To determine the radiation reliability of a system, data on the
failure of the components must be available. This means that unless someone
has done an experiment which irradiated the same device type at or above the
radiation levels of concern for the Probe, additional tests will be required.
Even if data is available-it will only "tell the designer that in the past,
looking at only one or two points of time, the device type was or was not
hard enough to meet the Probe criteria. Although there is an apparently large
quantity of radiation test data available, these should be used only as a guide
in the initial selection of components and reviewed carefully before appli-
cation as a criterion. There are various reasons for this point of view:
1) The time-frame of use of a given solid-state device is very
short, since new and improved devices are being made
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available at a rapid rate. The fact that a new device has
improved electrical performance characteristics does not
imply that its response to the effects of irradiation have
also improved. The contrary frequently occurs.
2) Manufacturers are continuously working at improving
processing techniques even in established, well-known
electrical device types. A change in processing can
radically alter the radiation effects characteristics
of a device, possibly for the worse, even though the
nominal electrical characteristics which determine its
"2N" classification have not changed.
3) Where established devices have undergone no change in manu-
facturing techniques, there is still the condition, due to
poor reproducibility of semiconductor surface conditions
and other device characteristics, that devices can vary
from batch to batch in radiation-sensitivity. It is also
well known that even devices out of the same batch and with
the same "date code" can vary.
4) The same device type, manufactured by several different
companies, can be distinctively different in radiation
response. This difference can be put to good advantage if
the characteristics of that device type are highly desirable;
while test data on the device obtained from the first manu-
facturer tried might indicate undesirable results, a broader
collection of test data covering other manufacturers could
show from which manufacturer an acceptable device can be
obtained. Thus, in planning a test program, a sampling
of products from several manufacturers should be anticipated.
5) There is a serious anomaly that is also a continual cause for
concern. It arises unheralded, except through test results.
It is the anomalous degradation of a single device (unit) that
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could be of any type number of any manufacturer. These "maverick"
type of degradations occur for no well-understood reason.
The behavior of the "maverick" is so widely different from the
norm (in the direction of excessive sensitivity to radiation)
that the occurrence of such a degradation effect could be
catastrophic to a spacecraft subsystem. Statistically,
"mavericks" occur sufficiently frequently that the possi-
bility of such an occurrence cannot be overlooked.
6) Certain "bulk" materials, such as thermal coating, optical
windows, and some organics, where stability of properties
is important, must also be tested carefully for damage
effects in the properties of interest, for the following
reason. The exact chemical mix of a commerical material will
often vary from lot to lot and produce results similar to
those described in Items 1 through 5 above. Such batch
variations can-have an important bearing on radiation
hardness. Organic paints"and glasses are important examples
of such materials.
Therefore, data on the radiation hardness of the actual device
groups used in the Probe systems is necessary for all critical components.
Available data can be used if a large, stable safety margin is established.
Development of a component data base for hardened design is also
complicated by the destructive nature of ionization and displacement damage
effects. Unlike temperature, shock, acceleration and reliability charac-
terization, test devices are not recommended for system application. Two
schemes have been proposed for non-destructive screens: irradiation to a
small fraction of the expected radiation level, and post-irradiation anneal
to recover the initial electrical performance characteristics. In the first
case, the damage is frequently a non-linear function of exposure level and
parameter degradation at low exposure levels does not predict the component
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hardness to the levels of confidence required for the Probe. This is particularly
true for complex microcircuits. Meanwhile, the process of radiation testing
actually causes the device to move -closer to the radiation failure level
and have that much less assurance of withstanding the Probe radiation require-
ments test.
Irradiation/annealing (IRAN) techniques cannot be used in general,
because in many device types the response to a second irradiation is more
severe than on the first screening irradiation, and may not even be cor-
related with the screening response, even if the anneal appears to be
complete by electrical measurements. If IRAN is to be used, it must be
qualified by an elaborate statistical test program involving re-irradiation
and objective correlation analysis.
The only approach which appears reasonable then, is to sample
the device group, test the sample, and then if the sample (with its statis-
tical indication of what the rest of the group will do in the same radiation
test) passes the specified criteria, accept the total group.
The approach then to obtain assurance in adequate hardness of
components used in a Probe system is as follows:
1) Collect past data on each part type to determine how
soft the devices may be and how much data will need to
be collected in new tests.
2) Collect new data over several small groups of devices if
no past data exist or if the past data gave an indication
of wide variability in radiation hardness.
3) Procure the total group when enough data is available that
demonstrates a method of procurement that will give a high
probability of getting an acceptable group of devices.
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4) Sample the procured group to make sure the group satisfies
the radiation criteria.
5) If the sample does not pass the criteria after spending the
money on procurement, then use every "trick-in-the-Handbook"
either through design techniques or as a last resort, shielding
to force the groups to pass. Self-shielding by component
positioning is the first step, with additional shielding
realized by adding materials.
6) If none of these techniques work, then selection of another
device or devices that will pass the criteria is necessary.
As can be seen above, statistics play a major part in the test re-
sults when compared to the radiation criteria.. By obtaining enough past
data and then applying statistical methods to the data, we can get some
assurance that further testing will tell us the same results. Unfortunately,
past data on the exact device type that will be used in our system may not
be available,' either because the device is too new or no one had an interest
in testing the device type previously. To find these past data is sometimes
/
very difficult but there are three sources that can provide a good survey
of what good data does exist. These are:
1) JPL Component Characterization Data.8
2) Harry Diamond Labs Data Bank - Washington, D.C.
3) IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science.
During the MJS program JPL performed numerous device irradiations,
primarily with 2.5 MeV electrons and Co . The Harry Diamond Labs maintain
a data bank which summarizes radiation response data for various semicon-
ductor devices. Usually the sample size is relatively small. Many ex-
periments that have been performed on device types are summarized in the
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IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Science. Between these and the designer's own
sources, collection of usable past data can be done with the least amount of
pain. For the designer's convenience, we have referenced the location of
articles which helped formulate this handbook.
This handbook has not tried to provide a comprehensive list of data
on every device type known, since this approach could not hope to cover new
device types. It would be wasteful, since most of the devices will not be
used in the Probe.
The past data is important since it will possibly save a significant
amount of radiation testing on small groups. Radiation testing is expensive
and justifies spending some time reviewing past data. The past data will
hopefully tell the designer which options are available to him for procuring
radiation hardened devices.
A final point about the past data before the actual design guide-
lines are presented: the data should represent a similar or worst-case
condition when related to the Probe worst-case operating condition. Other-
wise the data will give a false beginning point in the guideline flow charts
and end up costing time and money for an experiment to eventually pass the
acceptance criteria. The previous sections of this handbook tell how to
determine what parameters are most important and what conditions are worst
case.
The flow charts presented in the following subsections are designed
for specific component types based on what is known about the critical para-
meters, the nature of failure, and the stability of the technology. Each
block in the flow charts is discussed in the narrative following the charts
to provide details of how to do the operation, what an example looks like and
where supplemental data can be found in this handbook to help the designer
complete the block. After going through the chart for the first few device
types, the flow charts will probably be the only parts of the handbook
needed by the designer for the remaining device types.
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The flow charts were designed to pass proven radiation hardened
device types with a minimum cost of hardness assurance. If device types
have not been proven hard from past data, then the task of assuring
success of the Probe mission becomes more involved, but necessary if
each experiment is to do its' job with a high probability of success. The
flow charts were constructed to give the designer a way to objectively
determine the options he must consider for every device type and application.
How the device is used, who makes the device and new types of devices are
all variables in determining the radiation hardness that must be considered
when the system is built and during the hardness assurance process.
Simultaneous accumulation of displacement effects and long-term
ionization effects are taken into account. Also, the displacement effects
can be the result of protons or electrons at various energy levels. Since
there is an energy level dependence and particle, type dependence, we have
2
normalized all displacement data used in the flow charts to neutrons/cm
(1-MeV equivalent). This allows past neutron data to be used for qualifying
various component types for displacement effects.
3.2.2 Statistical Considerations
Statistical variations must be recognized and treated in
using experimental data in the design process. In effect, each statistical
variable must be considered by an increase in the safety margin between the
response of the average device and the system requirements. The important
variables are of two types:
1) the variation between device units for a particular device
type (e.g., the population distribution), and
2) the uncertainty in our knowledge of the population distri-
bution parameters (e.g., due to limits on size of test sample).
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It is obvious that safety margins can be smaller if the population
distribution is narrower (e.g., single manufacturer, few proximate date
code lots or still better, selected diffusion lots or wafers). The safety
margin can also be smaller for larger test samples. Therefore, it is most
efficient to purchase each device type for a system at one time and per-
form a single irradiation sample test to characterize the entire lot.
We will assume that for each device type the radiation response
variation between units will produce a log-normal distribution (i.e., a
statistically normal distribution against the log of the device parameter)
in radiation level at which the device falls outside a specified performance
limit; i.e., a log-normal distribution in susceptibility levels. Although
this assumption may appear to be bold, it is borne out by some limited data.51
It should be noted that a log-normal and normal distribution become equivalent
for small standard deviations.
The alternate to some assumption on the distribution is to use
Baysian statistics. These would produce unreasonable test requirements (e.g.,
radiation test many systems worth of parts). Instead, we recommend assuming
the log-normal distribution but remain alert for any data that violate this
assumption.
Given a log-normal distribution with a mean, M, and a standard de-
viation, o (in units of multiples of M), we can consult standard statistical
tables to relate the failure budget for each part, p_., to the safe de-
iu
sign point, Ma . Table 3.1 presents a summary of such data. For example,
if a device has a failure budget of 10 per unit, its design point should be
a factor of a ' away from the mean failure level, where a is the true
standard deviation of the population.
Note: M and a are the mean and standard deviation of the true population
while Ms and s are the mean and standard deviation of the measured
sample.
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Unfortunately, the mean, M, and standard deviation of the popula-
tion are generally known imperfectly, being estimated only by the mean, M ,
and standard deviation, s, of a test sample of size n. Again, assuming the
2
true population is log-normal, the x an^ Student's t distribution can
be used to estimate the additional margin of safety required between M
and s. For small p,.., the uncertainty in o is usually most important.
Table 3.2 presents the exponent, w, of the measured s to calculate the
desired worst-case a, at 90% confidence level.
TABLE 3.1: Values of Power of Standard Deviation for
Required Probability of Failure
Pfi
ID'9
io-8
ID'7
ID'6
Design Factor
(in a±u)
-5.9
-5.5
-5.2
-4.8 .
Pfi
. ID'5
lO'4
lO'3
io-2
Design Factor
(in a±u)
-4.3
-3.9
-3.3
-2.3
Note: Assumes a log-normal distribution. pf. = probability
of failure allowed for each unit.
TABLE 3.2: Standard Deviation Factors for 90% Confidence
n
3
4
5
s-factor
(w)
4.9
2.6
2.2
n
10
20
30
s-factor
(w)
1.5
1.3
1.2
Note: Derived from the relationship x = -7 where x
o^
is the value from statistical tables for c = 90%
confidence, n = number of samples, a = overall group
standard deviation, and s = sample standard deviation,
n-1 = degrees of freedom.
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The correction factor on the mean to obtain a 90% confidence value
U.28\/1.28V
W\Vn- / .is S vfn ' . Therefore, the mean and standard deviation values obtained
from the sample data have now been corrected for the small sample sizes and
represent worst case values for the true population mean and standard dev-
iation with a 90% confidence. The final expression for the safe design point
required to give the probability of failure is then obtained by using the
expression:
where M = sample mean value
S = sample standard deviation
w = correction factor on the standard deviation for
small sample sizes
- • . • n = sample size
3.2.3 Data Review
3.2.3.1 Bipolar Transistors and Similar Discrete Components
This section shows how to qualify bipolar transistors*,
diodes, JFETS*, SCRS, optical devices and other similar components which
have meaningful performance parameters varying continuously with accumu-
lated radiation. As long as the variation is somewhat regular (i.e.,
no abrupt change in the parameter for increasing radiation levels(, flow
chart I can be applied for discrete components. The critical criteria is
defined as the design margin (DM) for the required levels of survival pro-
bability and confidence.
NOTE: Appendix A discusses what a log-normal distribution is, how the above
expressions were derived and provides a few examples of how to use
the expressions above.
* Note: Exceptions to the list above can be found in Section 3.2.3.3.
Check this list for other exceptions
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The data used should represent the variation in the parameter response
for a single radiation level at or above the Probe system requirement, (i.e.,
if the system radiation requirement for long-term ionization is 10 rad(Si)
then the variation in A(l/hPP) over several bipolar transistors of the
5
same type at one radiation level at or above 10 rad(Si) is the desired
data). The approach in Flow Chart II can also be used for these devices, if
desired.
3.2.3.2 Bipolar Integrated Circuits and Complex Devices not
Covered in (3.2.3.3) [an abrupt change in parameter with
radiation level]
The abrupt change of meaningful parameters with radiation
accumulation and/or the complexity of these types of devices make the mea-
surement of parameter variations very difficult. Even if these parameter
variations were continuous and regular, it would be hard to relate them
to one specific radiation-degradation mechanism within the'device. The
device parameter variation due to radiation may actually be the result
of several element parameters interacting nbn-linearly.
The data on radiation effects is therefore related to how many
devices fail a selected parameter criterion versus radiation level. The
data is taken over a radiation range that shows a distribution in failure
versus increasing radiation levels. It is not necessary to restrict our
data to the Probe system design radiation levels since we want only to
know where the failure distribution exists and how close it is to our system
radiation design level. If the failure distribution is at or below the
system design radiation level then there will be.a severe problem in assuring
the high probability of survival for the system when using this part type.
If it falls above the system level, then calculations of DM (Design Margin)
on the flow charts will provide the level of hardness assurance.
118
3.2.3.3 MOS and Bipolar Linear Integrated Circuits
These two device types are exceptions to the complex com-
ponents considered in Flow Chart II. The variation in radiation hardness
of these technologies between manufacturers and over significant time periods
has been great. Therefore, to have any chance of procuring a uniform group
(in radiation response), a more strict approach to procurement is necessary.
The handbook has therefore done the preliminary work for the designer in
stating that there is no way the designer can pass the acceptance criteria
for these device technologies unless he uses the more strict procurement
method, approach "A". (See paragraph 3.2.4.1)
Some past data collection is required but this is designed to aid the
designer in determining exactly which techniques appear valid in controlling
the radiation hardness during procurement. Procurement will be restricted
for these two device technologies to selected manufacturers and only
qualified process runs.
Other types of devices which will require some type of process
control or traceability are listed below:
a) Bipolar transistors for hybrid circuits
b) N-channel JFET's in applications requiring small leakage
currents and analog switches containing JFET's and MOS
transistors.
c) Quartz crystal for precision oscillators and filter.
3.2.3.4 Block Descriptions for Flow Charts I, II and III
(pp. 133, 134, 135)
Block la
The radiation limits to which the component type will be
in the system must be defined. The component may not have the same restrictions
of radiation levels as the system due to the inherent shielding from other
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surrounding subsystems. A calculation of the shielding and the effects on
the effective radiation levels at the component location can be calculated
using the techniques as were described in Section 1.2.2 of this handbook.
A worst-case estimate would be equal to the radiation levels specified for
the entire system [e.g., D = 10 rads(Si), $ = 9 x 10 protons/cm
12 2(20 MeV equivalent) and $ = 2.5 x 10 electrons/cm (3 MeV equivalent)].
If neutron irradiation data are to be used, the proton and electron displace-
ment fluence are converted to a worst case neutron equivalent fluence
0 <_ 30$2o + -06 $3 • In some particular cases, where the type of device
and injection level can be estimated, smaller values of $, can be used for
the reduced damage constants as shown in Tables 3.3 through 3.4.
Block Ib
For Flow Chart I the parameter(s) chosen to characterize
the device response should have two characteristics:
1) Design application is determined by quantitative .
parameter values.
2) The parameter changes are almost linear with radiation
exposure near the expected exposure.
For Flow Charts II $ III only the first criterion need be met.
The design limits and failure criteria specified must take into
account a safety margin for degradation modes other than radiation, (e.g.,
temperature, end-of-life).
For transistors the most common relevant parameter is (1/hpp) at
the collector current of interest, or lower. Sometimes Vrp is alsoLfcSAT
important. Leakage currents, e.g., IrRn or IrFf. , are rarely controlling.
For diodes the change in leakage current are usually small enough
to be negligible in almost all applications. In precision temperature-com-
pensated voltage regulator diodes (VRD) the breakdown voltage V^ may
change slightly.
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TABLE 3.3: 20 MeV Proton Damage Constants'^ appendlx
K (cm2/sec)
Resistivity (ohm-cm)
n-type
1
10
100
£-type
1
10
100
Injection Level
10"3 10"1
2 - 10 x 10"5 1 - 5 x 10"5
% 5 x 10"6
- - - -
1 - 3 x 10"5 * 1 x 10"5
% 5 x 10"6
_ _ _ _
TABLE 3.4: 3 MeV Electron Damage Constants"(appendlx
KT(cm2/sec)
Resistivity (ohm-cm)
n-type
1
10
p-type
1
10
100
Low
0.6 -
2 -
1 -
0.5 -
'V
Injection
(< 10'2)
3 x 10"7
10 x 10"8
4 x 10"8
2 x 10'8
3 x 10"9
Level
High (>1)
<v 5 x ID'8*
* 1 x ID'8*
2 - 8 x 10"9
1 - 4 x 10"9
* 6 x lO'10
* Estimated from trends
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Blocks 2 and 4
All past data should be considered as old data no matter how recent.
This is because the device fabrication procedures can vary significantly,
even within one manufacturer's product, and this variation can be directly
related to changes in radiation response. Also, bias and temperature can
affect the results of a test which means that the data collected may not
match the designers system application.
A requirement in this block is therefore imposed, which requires
the collection of as much data from several sources as possible. The more
data used, the less chance of having to redo the design later.
If very few data exist, which cannot be related directly to the
designers application, the design procedure requires going to Block 12 where
several options exist. Use of approach "C" is not one of the options in
this case.
• ' " *
Assume, from this point on, that some data exist on which an esti-
mate can be made. This will require a minimum of 3 devices tested in a
similar or relatable operating mode to the Probe system application.
Data at fluence levels very different from the application can be
used as long as the relevant parameter changes are linear with radiation
exposure between the radiation limits and test points, or at least the linear
assumption produces a case. This restriction usually implies that data can
be used in which the parameter changes fall within the acceptable parameter
design limits and radiation exposures, equal or exceed the radiation design
limits. Care must be taken in selecting data that no bias is introduced in
the data sample by any selection procedure. It is invalid to reject data
only because the changes are large. It is valid to reject all data at high
exposures because some of the parameter changes fall outside of the linear
assumption.
Transistor pre-selection can be made by considering the relationship
between f and A(l/hpE) discussed in Section 2.1.2. If a choice exists,
a transistor with high f™ should be used.
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For Flow Charts II and III, the data are usually in the form of
failure vs. fluence. Again, all fluences are assumed to be in terms of
displacement equivalent fluence. In Flow Chart II, bipolar digital ICs are
considered. In general, these are very insensitive to both displacement
and long-term ionization effects, and relatively minimal data can serve to
qualify these devices for Probe applications.
Flow Chart III requires a restriction to diffusion runs or wafer
lots. This is because for MOS integrated circuits (ICs) and Bipolar Linear
ICs the variation in long-term ionization effects is so great that these de-
vices must be procured from one manufacturer with diffusion-run and sometimes
even wafer traceability.
Displacement effects in MOS can be ignored altogether for Probe ap-
plications, since the known threshold for damage is well above the radiation
limits. "
Linear integrated circuits are extremely sensitive to ionizing
radiation effects and somewhat sensitive to displacement effects. The
most important parameters to be measured in operational amplifiers and com-
parators are: input offset voltage, input offset current, input bias current,
open loop gain under suitable load conditions and sink current capability.
A/D or D/A converters are also very sensitive to total dose effects and the
measurement is somewhat complex. Among the more important parameters are
output current, gain and offset voltage. Voltage regulators are relatively
insensitive to total dose effects. The output voltage and voltage regula-
tion are the relevant parameters.
Therefore for Flow Chart III, data collected and used for the
calculations based on past data has two purposes:
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1) To see if past process control techniques were able to
satisfy the component design hardness assurance requirements
for this system, and
2) what process controls were used so that the same component
hardness can be procured for the Probe system components.
The more controls needed, the more expensive the device will be.
If no data exists on the controls, then the designer should go to Block 12
and choose one of the options including Option A (now modified).
Block 3
The failure budget of a component in the system is the maximum
probability of failure allowed to that component so that the system can
perform its function at a given probability of success. For example: If a
system had a probability of success assigned to it of 99% and the system
contained 1000 transistors, all of one type, then the failure budget for
each transistor would be 10
For worst-case evaluations, assume all device units are to have
the same maximum probability of failure and that all devices in the system
must operate properly for the system to operate satisfactorily. Later on
in the Flow Chart, if a device type cannot meet these worst-case require-
ments, some of the survivability budget can be reassigned to the softer
parts and some of the design burden shifted onto inherently harder device
types. This will be one of the options considered at Block 12.
_,< .
Blocks 5 and 7
For each set of data the measured parameters of the population dis-
tributions are now determined. In the case of Flow Chart III, these must be
evaluated for diffusion-lot or wafer samples. In Flow Charts I and II they
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can be aggregated in any assembly that is representative of expected device
procurement, including collecting together all data of a particular device
type irrespective of manufacturer or date code.
Each data set is then fitted to a log-normal distribution, and the
mean, X and standard deviation, s, evaluated. Examples of data plots in
which the samples are sorted by manufacturer are shown in Figures 3.1 through
3.3. If-the-data frbni"the" two suppliers were assembled into a single population,
the method is still applicable, although the value of s would become larger.
The particular neutron irradiation data shown in Figures 3.1 - 3.3 would still
probably satisfy Probe requirements, since the failure thresholds are high.
These illustrate an important option: if the mixed distribution is too wide
to be acceptable, the data can be reanalyzed by supplier, or by date code,
usually resulting in a more favorable distribution. Of course, if adequate
hardness depends on such a selection, the device type must be procured from a
single supplier (and possibly date code lot) and sample tested (Method B).
Blocks 6 and 8
We use Table 3.2 to obtain the correction factor, w, on "s" so that
the a values will be obtained with 90% confidence.
Block 9
Based on the survivability budget calculated for the component type
in Block 3, Table 3.1 can be used to obtain the power of a to give the
required failure rate.
Blocks 10 and 11
If the measured parameters, X and s, are truly representative of the
device population, the required value of survivability and confidence can be
achieved by using the device at or below the limit:
xs
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where "+" is used for distributions involving parameter variations at a par-
ticular dose or fluence level and "-" is used for distributions involving
radiation levels for failure. However, many data are taken on small samples,
possibly at one time, and the measured s may be much smaller than the spread
in values bridging the tested device to currently manufactured devices.
Studies of the distribution of displacement effects52 and long-term ionization
effects12 for a few parts extending over a period of years indicate that
safe values for displacement is a 'v 1.5 and for long-term ionization effects
a ^  2. Therefore, we recommend that old data not be extrapolated more
favorable than with these values of a.
Block 12
Taking the values obtained in Blocks 10 and 11 and dividing these
numbers into the limits determined in Block 1, will determine which option
is available based on past data. If the design margin (DM) value meets the
criteria for acceptance of past data then use Flow Chart IV on approach "C".
If the DM values were > 1 for transistors, approach "C" could be
used to procure the total group of transistors for the system with a good
probability that the components would pass the qualification test (to be
discussed later). Even if the test showed a problem, the problem should
be small enough so that slight modifications in design or shielding would
allow the total group to be accepted.
The design margin (DM) was determined in this Handbook by a statistical
approach using calculated values rather than a graphical method on probability
graph paper as is sometimes done. Both methods can be used but the calculated
value approach requires only a calculator and the mean and standard deviation
values of the sample population. Once these tools are acquired, the criteria
for qualifying a device type for radiation hardness can be obtained by simply
plugging values into a formula and turning the crank. The calculated value
approach also allows the designer to determine the simultaneous radiation
effects from both displacement and long-term ionization processes. By comparing
the calculated values from the sample data to the design limits, the designer
can evaluate whether the displacement or long-term ionization effect is the
most severe problem and what the relative prioroty of hardness design has to
be assigned to each device type.
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90%
70% - •
50% -'
30%
10% • •
0.1%
SUPPLIER 2
N = 100
1014
N/CM
Figure 3.1: Probability of Failure vs Neutron Fluence for Two
Suppliers of a DTL flip-flop;52 M = 1.25.
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90% T
70% ..
50%
30%
10% ••
0.1!
SUPPLIER 1
N = 28
SUPPLIER 2
N = 18
1013 3 x 1013 1014
N/CM2 (1 MeV Equivalent)
Figure 3.2: Probability of Failure vs Neutron Fluence for Two
Suppliers of a General Purpose Amplifier;52 M = 1.25.
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ier 1
N = 30
3xl013 10
N/CM2 (1 MeV Equivalent)
14
Figure 3.3: Probability of Failure vs Neutron Fluence for Two
Suppliers of the 2N5038 Power Transistor;52 M = 1,25.
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Block 14
The first option shown in the Flow Charts is a change in device type.
If another device type will do the same function and data can be found which
shows that it will provide a DM > 1 resulting in a simpler procurement
class used, then this may be the most cost effective approach. Most of the
work up to using a particular option has been paper calculations with no
parts purchased. Once the parts are procured, both component costs and
radiation testing time will begin to add costs to the system. Therefore,
it is beneficial to evaluate the selection of parts at this point. If
another device type is desired, Section 2 should be consulted to determine
which types appear less susceptible due to their inherent hardness as a
result of construction techniques on electrical properties.
The result of using the option on selecting another part is to
restart the Flow Chart with the new selected device type.
. Block 15
This option requires an understanding of the limitations and flex-
ibility of the circuit design. If a component type is necessary in the system
but degrades under radiation to a point beyond the circuit requirements, a
change in circuit design can be attempted.
The result of this option is a change in Block Ib and a recalculation
of Block 12. This may provide a fast and effective result especially if DM
was initially very close to the acceptance criteria.
Block 16
A change in survivability budget just means that some of the proba-
bility for failure required of some very hard components has been shifted to
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more soft component. A reliability specialist can make a quick reassessment
of this change in budget to determine how much survivability budget can be
redistributed.
This option really requires that all parts are initially evaluated
by the Flow Charts and then a comparison of the DM values is made. For very
large values of DM, the reliability can be tightened-up even further in order
to relax some of the reliability restrictions on a few of the very soft and
very expensive device types (e.g., MOS microprocessor). As an example,
assume the system has a survivability budget of 0.99. Then for 990 tran-
sistors all of the same type and 10 microprocessors, the system failure
budget for each part was originally 0.01/1000 which for worst-case con-
siderations was 10 . This required a y = 4.3 and was a very strict
criteria for MOS microprocessors. But if the budget were revised so that the
-4budget for the microprocessor components was only 3 x 10 or u = 3.6,
9 A
then the new budget for the other 990 devices is (10~ - 3 x 10 )/990 =
7 x 10 ; resulting in u = 4.4. .
This new power of the standard deviation "s" is only slightly higher
than the original 4.3.
The result of redistributing the survivability budget is a re-
calculation of Blocks 9, 10, 11 and 12 before another decision can be made.
More past data do not need to be collected.
Block 17
Shielding can be a very useful technique but there io a limit to
how much shielding can be used in a system due to weight and space restrictions;
a trade-off is usually required.
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Two main types of shielding are available:
1) Relocation of the sensitive devices.
2) Additional material (e.g., local shielding).'
Type 1 shielding imposes no extra weight since it only means placing
the more sensitive parts deep within the system to take advantage of the in-
herent shielding from the rest of the circuitry. It requires additional
system layout time and some rough calculations on shielding effectiveness.
Type 2 shielding adds additional protection over and above that
already specified for the system. This can be done universally over a
large volume or localized over a few sensitive parts.
Either type of shielding results.in a difference in the limits .
determined in Block 1, which requires a re-assessment of the calculations
and the data points.
Blocks 15, 18 and 19
These options are related to the restrictions on procurement needed
to obtain an acceptable group. Approach "B" is less restrictive than approach
"A" and therefore, cost less money. On the other hand, if approach "B" is
used when approach "A" should have been used, the designer will eventually
end up in approach "A", but only after many tests and much money.
The decision as to which approach is sufficient, is already made
for MOS and Bipolar Linear ICs; for these device types, the data shows too
wide a variation for any approach other than "A".
Approach "B" is used if there is little or no past data on the
device types considered for Flow Charts I and II. Also it is used if
the DM is close to acceptance.
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Approach "C" can be used if the old data demonstrate a clear safety
margin between parts performance and Probe requirements.
3.2.4 Hardness Assurance Approaches For Procurement
3.2.4.1 Approaches "A". "B" and "C"
Three approaches to device procurement and testing are
described in Flow Charts IV, V and VI (Figures 3.7 - 3.9).
Approach "C" is the most straightforward and least costly, while
Approach "A" is the most strict and most expensive. If a large amount of
past data show a very narrow change in radiation hardness over several
years and for several manufacturers, and the hardness level is high enough
to give a good probability of successful"completion of the experiment or
system function, then Approach "C" will probably be the selected approach.
In reality, Approach "B" will probably be the approach used for
a majority of the device types, just due to a lack of data.
Approach "A" is already determined to be necessary for MOS and
bipolar linear IC's in which long-term ionization effects are known to
cause large variation.
Again, each block in the Flow Charts IV, V and VI is described
in a narrative section following each Flow Chart.
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FLOW CHART IV - BLOCK DESCRIPTION
Block (C1) The designer is at this block because past data
showed that these devices have a good chance of passing the more general
procurement test. Therefore, the entire group of devices to be used in
the system (plus a few extra for sampling) are procured according to normal
spacecraft procurement standards.
Block (C2) Samples of at least 5 devices are required for
radiation tests in each of the displacement and ionization environments
of concern. The number of devices should be greater than 5 if possible,
since another calculation of DM is going to be made and this time the
actual "S" value will be used along with the C = 90% correction factor, w.
If the number of devices (n) = 30 or greater, then w ^  1 and the group
will be evaluated on its. own data, not on data with a large error factor.
Block (C3) The radiation tests will require worst-case system
conditions both electrical and temperature.
Block (C4) Recalculate the variables as was done in Flow
Charts I, II and III and use the same criteria for acceptance, except that
the restriction on a >_ 1.5 for displacement and a >_ 2 for ionization effects
is eliminated. Since this sample was taken from the total group, and
acceptib.le value for DM means that the particular device type is accepted
for application in the system with no restrictions.
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Block (C5) This block resulted from several possibilities:
(a) The past data was not sufficient to give a true
variability in degradation and now we are seeing
the true variability.
(b) The tests on the sample group from Block (C2) were
performed incorrectly.
(c) There is a strong manufacturer related variability or
date code variability that has made s too large.
Since we have already purchased the entire group of devices of
this type, it would be fairly expensive to just throw away the parts and
try one of the other options on Flow Charts I, II or III without trying to
force the group into acceptance by applying tools that are available.
These tools or techniques include:
1. Modify Design Requirements
2. Separate Manufacturers
3. Change the surviveability budget of this device type
4. Apply Shielding Techniques
Techniques 3 and 4 were discussed in Blocks (16) and (17) of the
Flow Charts I, II and III. Technique 2 is self-explanatory. By using 2,
at least part of the group may be salvaged. Technique 1 relates primarily to
discrete parts, in which the design requirements can be relaxed by component
biasing or performance derating.
If no modification is possible then, we must return to Flow Chart
I or II and select a different option.
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Blocks (C6) and (C7) If a modification is possible then
depending on the severity of the modification, another test sample may be
required to verify the technique. Iteration of Block (C5) may be required
to find an acceptable technique.
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1. Date Code Lot Sampling
This is usually done where wafer or diffusion-
metallization lot control does not exist.
10 samples per lot.
Non-uniformity of measured parameters over lot
indicates lack of process control.
2. Production Lot Sampling
A production lot from one manufacturer usually
contains more than one date code, and may represent
production starts over a two month period.
Block (B4) and (B5) If another sample is needed to verify the
new modification, then these blocks are used for all sampling and retesting.
Recalculation of the DM value using only the data from Block (B4) is re-
quired.
If DM meets the acceptance criteria then an approach similar to
Approach "C" in the remaining blocks is used. If DM does not meet the
criteria, an iteration of (B3) is used. If no further modification is
possible, then we must return to Block (12) of Flow Charts I or II for
selection of another option.
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FLOW CHART V - BLOCK DESCRIPTIONS
After Blocks (Bl) and (B2) are completed successfully, the rest
of the flow chart is very similar to flow chart IV - Approach "C" except
that a pre-selection process was used prior to the purchase of the total
group for the system. This may restrict some of the options available in
the analysis section of Approach "C". The blocks discussed here will
emphasize only the difference between Approach "B" and Approach "C".
Block (Bl) Since past data was not sufficient to make DM
pass the acceptance criteria, new data must be obtained. By new data, it
is meant that radiation tests (displacement and/or ionizatiqn) are per-
formed on small groups of devices (between 5 and 30 in number) from selected
candidate manufacturers. Worst case Probe operating conditions should be
used in these tests.
Block (B2) Calculate the variables discussed in Flow Charts
I, II and III from the new data only, eliminating the previous restrictions
on a. If DM meets the acceptance criteria, use Approach "C" procedure for
the rest of the flow chart. If DM fails the criteria, an analysis mode is
attempted in Block (B3).
Block (B3) Small modifications may be possible in redefining
the new data on sample groups. If for example, a manufacturer selection
will make DM acceptable, then this change is documented and becomes an
amendment to procurement class R-B for this device type. The following
are two examples of limitations on the procurement class.
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FLOW CHART VI - BLOCK DESCRIPTION
The necessity of using Approach "A" is usually generated by two
important factors: a critical need for this device type and the fact
that the device type could not satisfy the DM acceptance criteria by any
other means. Localized shielding may still be a possibility but the limits
on this approach may force a procurement into Approach "A".
Block (AT) Sample groups should be procured from one or
more manufacturers but the devices should be separated into groups by
diffusion lot or wafer. Each device, during fabrication should have as
many radiation control techniques applied as is necessary to reduce the
susceptibility to radiation levels of concern. The complete set of processing
techniques necessary for the state-of-the-art in hardened device fabrication
are unique for each device type and manufacturer. At this level careful
negotiations are required in the trade-off of electrical performance
parameters, radiation hardness and device yield (i.e., cost and delivery).
General guidelines for device hardening have been developed for displace-
ment damage and long term ionization effects and are familiar to manufactur-
ers such as Fairchild, Harris, Motorola, National, RCA and Texas Instruments.
When using the devices obtained from the diffusion runs, test
the samples in displacement and/or ionization environments, as needed,
using worst case system conditions.
When procuring devices using some of the above techniques, it
would be cost effective to contact several manufacturers to see if a
hardened device of this type already exists and obtain the information
as to which techniques were used.
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Two techniques for sampling components out of a process run to
determine if the group will meet the DM acceptance criteria are diffusion
lot sampling and wafer lot sampling. The latter is usually used to screen
out non-acceptable wafers in a diffusion run. The techniques are summarized
below:
1. Wafer Lot Sampling
Most rigorous: guarantees wafer fabrication control,
but not assembly mavericks.
Sampling Plan: 5 to 10 samples from different parts of
wafer in accordance with standard sampling
procedure.
Non-uniformity of measured parameters over wafer indicates
lack of process control and rejection of lot.
Execution: Die attach, bond and seal package, test in
package. This is the simplest method and works.
Other methods involving wafer probing have
problems due to the need for irradiation under
correct bias conditions, in situ measurements
immediately after irradiation and ambient
effects during irradiation.
2. Diffusion - Metallization Lot Sampling
Next best sampling method.
It is necessary to obtain the samples from more than one
wafer.
5 to 10 samples per lot.
Non-uniformity of measured parameters over lot indicates
lack of process control and necessity to go to
wafer lot sampling.
Execution: as for wafer lot sampling.
146
Total dose effects are sometimes affected by die attach,
sealing, stabilization bake and burn-in operations. If the devices used
for lot sampling did not undergo precisely the same treatment and on the
same line as the final procurement lot, additional tests must be carried
out on samples drawn from the procurement lot. This can be done at in-
frequent intervals compared to the original sampling plan. Any variation
from the original results must be immediately investigated and may lead
to rejection of the procurement lot.
Block (A2) Make the calculations for DM using only new data
from one process run at a time. Compare this DM value.to the acceptance
criteria.
Block (A3) If the DM value did not meet the acceptance
criteria, other modification should be attempted and new devices fabricated.
This is quite an expensive iteration process and requires the commitment of
• ' •
a manufacturer to use one of his process lines for essentially an R' § D
effort.
If no modifications are possible, this probably means that the
total group will have a radiation susceptibility level too low even for
localized shielding. Either return to Block (12) of Flow Charts I, II or
III and choose another option or as a last resort, proceed with the pur-
chase of the entire group using every radiation hardening technique
possible and then shield that specific part as required.
Block (A4) This procurement used all the techniques for
fabrication defined as necessary from Block (A2). If process and wafer
traceability are required, then they should be applied to the total group
as well.
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Some sort of wafer qualification may be useful where five devices
are extracted from each wafer (one from each quadrant and one from the center)
before the devices in the wafer have been packaged. Package each of the five
devices and radiation test. If the response is satisfactory for the system
requirements, then accept the wafer for processing through the normal high
reliability screen and packaging procedures.
Block (A5) Radiation test the devices from a single process
run and recalculate DM. If DM passes, then the total process run is
accepted, assuming all other high reliability requirements are satisfied.
If it does not pass, then try localized shielding.
Block (A6) Apply localized shielding to force the DM value
to pass the acceptance criteria.
3.2.4.2 Radiation Procurement Classes - Definition*
Normal - Class - R - C
Devices are off-the-shelf high-rel parts meeting no
special requirements on manufacturer or date code controls for radiation
response.
Class-R-B
Devices are off-the-shelf high-rel parts having
some restrictions based on results of new data obtained from sample tests
(Block (Bl) and (B2)). Specific manufacturers, date code uniformity,
electrical parameters or special features are examples of types of re-
strictions which may be imposed as amendments.
These are our own definitions which should be coordinated with specific
NASA procurement direction.
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Class-R-A
Devices are special parts procured from one or more
manufacturers using diffusion-lot or wafer controls (whichever is needed)
and application of known processing techniques to improve the probability
for survival of the devices during radiation tests. High-rel requirements
must still be satisfied.
3.3 Experimental Characterization
Design of hardened systems is probably limited more often by in-
adequate, irrelevant and inaccurate experimental data on component radiation
effects than any other single step in the design process. The total re-
sources which must be involved in the experimental characterization are:
1) management, 2) technical support in relating test conditions to those in
system application, 3) definition of adequate test facilities and sources,
4) accurate and thorough documentation of test data, as well as 5) analysis
and review of data for design application. Experimental characterization is
expensive, but not as expensive as a vulnerable system.
The component evaluation process outlined in this Handbook is
intended to establish the cost-effective data base necessary for high-
surviveability system design. In this section considerations in experimental
characterization will be presented as critical from the viewpoint of the de-
signer. It is assumed that detailed knowledge of the radiation environments
of simulators, measurements of the particle flux and absorbed ionizing
radiation dose (i.e., dosimetry), as well as accurate recording of elec-
trical test conditions and performance parameters of the components is
familiar to the organization(s) directly involved in the experimental
characterization. It is the designer's responsibility, however, to identify
the test conditions on the device during radiation exposure, electrical
performance parameters measured during and/or after radiation exposure, to
interpret the data in the form of critical parameters, to be aware of the
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details of the experimental simulation that may affect an accurate repre-
sentation of the Probe exposure and performance conditions, and to define
requirements-for additional test data if required.
3.3.1 Electrical Bias Conditions During Radiation Exposure
The electrical bias on all MOS-type microcircuits
(p-MOS, n-MOS, CMOS, CCD's, image sensors, etc.) during radiation exposure
has a first-order effect on the magnitude of the radiation-induced damage.
The worst-case bias conditions in terms of decreasing severity are:
static d-c bias, all transistors with maximum positive
gate-substrate voltage (p-channel and n-channel devices)
static d-c bias, p-channel transistors with zero gate-
substrate voltage and n-channel transistors with maximum
positive gate-substrate voltage
static d-c bias, p-channel transistors with negative gate-
substrate bias voltage and n-channel transistors with posi-
tive gate-substrate voltage.
dynamic, clocked operation during exposure at maximum supply
voltage
The first test condition is representative of an array in which
transmission gates are used which allow positive gate-substrate bias on the
p-channel transistor elements. This results in the worst-case threshold
voltage shift on the p-channel transistors and generally the worst-case
test condition for array vulnerability. The second test condition is the
worst-case for an array with no transmission gates. The third test condition
is one that would be selected as representative of a typical static bias
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throughout the array and represents a severe, but not a worst-case bias
condition. The fourth test condition is generally the least-severe bias
condition during radiation exposure, and can be used if it accurately
simulates Probe operating conditions.
Electrical bias conditions during radiation exposure are also
critical on sensitive bipolar devices and raicrocircuits, particularly high-
performance analog microcircuits. For an individual bipolar transistor
element, worst-case bias conditions during radiation exposure are d-c bias
of the p-n junctions at the minimum forward bias or maximum reverse-bias
values to be experienced during circuit operation. These test conditions
also hold for the bipolar transistor elements in a microcircuit. In a
balanced microcircuit, however, additional consideration must be given to
the worst-case bias assymetry on the paired transistors. In this case,
the worst-case is generally the d-c bias condition of greatest assymetry.
Dynamic, or clocked exposure during radiation exposure is not the worst--
case test condition but is a reasonable simulation of actual damage if it is '
an accurate representation of device operation in the system. It is the
purpose of the statistical analysis described in Section 3.2 to establish
system surviveability. Hopefully, it is not necessary to compound the worst-
case by test conditions that are more severe than the worst experiences
in system application.
3.3.2 Electrical Parameter Measurement
Displacement damage resulting from electron, proton, or
neutron exposure is essentially stable over the temperature range of interest
for the Probe. Because of this, the radiation flux during exposure and the
time delay between exposure and electrical performance measurement should always
be noted but are generally not critical. That is, the effect depends on
the fluence and is stable at system ambient temperatures. Measurements of
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electrical performance can be made with the components in situ or removed
from the exposure facility to another laboratory.
Unfortunately, however, there is significant annealing of long-
term ionizing radiation effects at room temperature and above. This has
lead to studies to quantitatively determine the influence of dose rate of
exposure and the results of delaying device performance measurement follow-
ing exposure. Fortunately, for much of the Probe electronic components, it
is possible to almost directly simulate the exposure and required per-
formance conditions. The ionizing radiation environment of a cobalt-60
source of high-energy electron beam can be defined such that a dose rate of
10 - 20 rads(Si)/s is obtained in the components under test. Accelerating
the test by up to a factor of 5 is probably acceptable. Following com-
ponent exposure, or at a time delay up to that between the end of radiation
exposure during the Probe mission and the time required for active performance,
the electrical performance"parameters can be measured in situ. Lower ion-
izing radiation dose rates may be used, of course, if the shielded environ-
ment of the component is lower than that determined from the worst-case
exposure. Under these conditions, we feel that accurate simulation of the
electrical bias conditions during exposure is more critical to an accurate
assessment of radiation damage than the-uncertainties of dose rate during
exposure and short (less than 16 hours) delays in the measurement of post-
exposure electrical characteristics.
In review, then, displacement damage effects are stable, but long-
term ionizing radiation effects show significant (factors of 2 - 4 in effective
total dose) annealing effects. The ionizing radiation exposure of the Probe
electronics can be simulated with available facilities. The presence of
this effect should, however, be kept in mind when reviewing component data
obtained for application in non-space radiation environments. It should also
be pointed out that those experiments intended to simulate displacement
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damage effects also produce an ionizing radiation environment. Devices
sensitive to both ionizing and displacement damage effects will reflect the
combination of both in the displacement damage experiment and test conditions
of the ionizing radiation environment must be imposed to get usable data.
3.3.3 Characterization of Complex Microcircuits
The principal considerations in evaluating radiation-
induced permanent damage effects on MSI/LSI arrays are: 1) comprehensive
evaluation of pre-/post-electrical performance characterization, 2) selection
of electrical bias conditions during irradiation, and 3) determination of
the number of samples that must be characterized to insure adequate
statistical representation for component system qualification.
Electrical performance characterization of MSI/LSI arrays is a
well documented problem even without considering radiation-induced damage
effects. The most straightforward method of verifying the overall logic
function of the array is simply to compare the outputs of a damaged device
to those of a good reference device under the same input signal sequence
for all possible input conditions. The array interface, typically outputs,
must also be characterized in terms of the terminal current-voltage
characteristic to assure performance for specified external loads. In some
cases it is more convenient to simulate the reference "good" device logically
with a minicomputer programmed to direct the input sequence and compare the
output results. If the array is very complex and a large number of samples
must be tested the total number of input combinations can be reduced to the
set just sufficient to detect the failure of any logic cells. Generation
of test sequences can also be used to isolate the radiation-induced failure
analysis and possible hardening. Application of the test sequences to a
given array can be implemented analytically with logic simulation computer
programs that consider the array as a network of idealized logic functions.53
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Pre-/post-evaluation of array performance must also include the
system-defined temperature range. Bipolar transistor gain degradation be-
comes most critical when the gain is low at low temperatures. Junction
leakage currents, increased by displacement damage or surface effects, on
the other hand, become most critical at high temperatures. Variation in
the damage failure level due to both transistor gain degradation and junction
leakage currents over a wide range of case temperature was observed in the
neutron/electron-induced degradation of the SMS 8228 4,096-bit Schottky-
clamped TTL Read-Only-Memory. In this case, the room temperature evaluation
was the best-case compared to either low-or-high-temperature operation.3l*
Damage assessment of MSI/LSI arrays is sufficient to assure
adequate performance of internal logic cells, but not the safety margin to
the threshold of failure. The safety margin of the internal cells must be
determined experimentally. Damage effects at the interface cells, however,
can be measured quantitatively and a safety margin estimated, given load
requirements, by extrapolating slightly td higher exposure levels.
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SECTION 4
4.0 SUMMARY
The design handbook as presented has been intended as one of many
means to the hardened systems of the Probe. Principal emphasis has been
placed on methods rather than available data because the data base must
be as current as the evolving design. It is hoped that application of this
handbook will produce greater insight into the development of hardened
space systems and handbooks which can reflect more cost-effective methods.
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APPENDIX A
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
When analyzing a population for an effect such as radiation,
sampling is usually used; especially in radiation when the system components
cannot be subjected to the radiation tests. Then by applying statistical
correction factors to the sample data, a confidence level can be put on
the estimate of the total population and its response under the same con-
ditions.
For effects which are dependent on parameters that are additive
in nature, the population can usually be expressed in the form of a normal
distribution given in the form,
y = - x
For radiation effects, the parameters which describe the effects
appear to form a product rather than a sum. This was seen for both displace-
ment and long-term ionization effects on A l/h_P in transistors. For
r c
displacement,
1 0.2 K$
FE
where K was the radiation damage factor,
f_, was the gain-bandwidth product,
and was the fluence.
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Both K and £„ have independent distributions and form a product (quotient)
of parameters describing the displacement radiation effect. Therefore, a
normal distribution of the effect of radiation would not be expected. If
a logarithm is taken of the expression of displacement damage on A 1/hp- ,
the expression becomes;
log (A l/hpE) = constant + log $ + log K - log f™
which is now a sum of parameters again. A normal distribution of this ex-
pression may then be expected for the population. This relationship is
called a log-normal distribution (i.e., a normal distribution of the loga-
rithm of the experimental values). While the number of multiplicative
factors contributing to A (1/hpg) is not large enough to involve the
central limit theorem rigorously; experience has shown that the log-normal
distribution is a reasonable approximation to the measured distributions.
For example, ionizatibn effects on A l/hpE in 2N2222 transistors showed a
log-normal distribution.12 Since both types of radiation effects are
considered in this handbook, log-normal distributions will be assumed for
all semiconductor devices.
The use of the log-normal distribution approach is actually no
harder to use than the normal distribution if a small hand scientific
calculator is available. By changing all sample values of radiation effects
into logarithms before calculating the mean and standard deviation,
simple normal distribution approaches can be applied. These approaches
include calculating the error bars and appropriate reliability levels
on the distribution. Once these calculations are performed, a simple anti-
logarithm conversion puts the final values back into measured-parameter
space, so the designer can compare the values to his design limits.
From this point on, the approach to "calculating the error
bars and appropriate reliability levels will be derived, a final expression
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will be shown for the number which is compared to the design limit and an
example will be presented showing how to use the final expression.
The final expression to be used in comparing with the design limit
is;
X S~
where X = mean
S = standard deviation
w = 90% confidence correction factor
y = multiple of the standard deviation to obtain the desired
failure budget
n = sample size
The mean can be calculated on the geometric mean of the ihe'asured parameters
or as the mean of the logarithms. The standard deviation must use logarithms
in its calculation and then convert back to obtain S. Table 3.2 provides
the value of w and y is obtained from Table 3.1. If sample data is found
where a normal mean, X , and a normal standard deviation, S , are given,
S can be derived by letting
S S
S «= 1 + 3^- if -i « 1
X X
n n
— 1 3 2(as an example, if X = 0.0046 for A (l/hpE) after a fluence of 10 n/cm
and S = 0.0013 then
n
S
S ~ 1 + —
n
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To obtain the expression for the design margin value, standard
probability and confidence approximations were used (in the logarithm case).
First assume that all data has been converted to logarithms, Y.. Then
the problem of estimating errors and probabilities is just that of a normal
distribution. For a normal distribution, the standard deviation describes
the spread of the data such that 84% of all data points can be found above
the 1 standard deviation (a ) distance from the mean (Y). Above 2 a
from Y, 97.7% of the data points can be found and so on as far out as is
necessary to satisfy the failure budget for the device being considered.
-4
For example if the failure budget of a component is 0.0001 or 10 , then
by Table 3.1, at « 3.9 a from Y~, 99.99% of the components will be found
above this point. Therefore, to satisfy the failure.budget, the design
limit must be compared to a point ua from the mean Y (i.e., Y ± ua )
where y is obtained from Table 3.1.
The standard deviation described above is the actual total population
standard deviation; this value is usually not known exactly, but is inferred
from a sample standard deviation (S ). This sample standard deviation has
some error associated with it since it is a sample and not the value obtained
from the entire population. Therefore a correction factor must be applied to
S to give a 90% confidence that the total population a is represented.51*
y ^ 2
This correction factor is obtained from Table 3.2 which uses a x dis-
tribution approach where
,2 . "'V2
X 2
0y
and x values are obtained from tables found in several mathematical hand-
books. Let "w" equal the correction factor on S such that a < w S
for 90% confidence. Then the failure budget is satisfied at Y ± y w S- .
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The only uncertainty still remaining is in the value of the mean.
If we desire the same 90% confidence in the mean value, then by using the
fact that the mean has an error of for any normal population and at
1.28 a from the mean, 90% of the values fall above this point, then the
worst case, error on the mean would be at
1.28 a
Y ±
and the failure budget requirements are satisfied at,
_ A-28 a \
Y ± I ;=-*• + y w S 1 =
Y ±
1.28 S
>
VTT
+ y w S I or
All that is left now is to convert back to measured parameters out
jarithm values. Th:
Then the expression becomes,
of the log is is done by letting Y = log X and S = log S.
log X ± w y + 1.28\
VTT / log S
or,
x s
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APPENDIX B
EXAMPLE OF RADIATION HARDNESS ASSURANCE GUIDELINE ASSESSMENTS
From the Harry Diamond Laboratory data bank, 2N2222 transistors
from Fairchild were tested for displacement effects. If !„ = 1 mA and
Vrp = 5 volts for the design (or a lower lr or higher Vrp), displacementL<£ .. _ ~ L dE
damage effects at 1 x 10 n/cm fluence showed a mean A (l/hpE) of 0.0042
with a normal standard deviation of S = 0.0027. This test was on 12
devices in November of 1971. Therefore S = 1 + o'»n,o = 1.64. Since0.0042
this is one manufacturer at one period of time, the larger of 1.5 or 1.64
for S must be used.
Displacement >> X = 0.0042
S: = 1.64
nl = 12
For long-term ionization, data on tests12 of 2N2222 transistors
from Texas Instruments using 52 devices with manufacturing date codes from
1973 - 1975 showed a A (l/hp_) of 0.0134 and a standard deviation in the
log-normal sense of S = 1.8 for radiation levels of 150 krads and I- = 60 uA,
VCE = 40 volts-
NOTE: All the bias conditions in the long-term ionization example are worst
case to the displacement damage example so the long-term ionization data
will produce at least a worst case value of the design margin.
Since S = 1.8 for the long-term ionization case, S = 2 is used
due again to past data showing manufacturer variations and date code effects
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on-radiation levels which would influence the distribution.
Long-term ionization ^ X» = 0.0134
S2 = 2
n2 = 52
Blocks J10[and (Tlf in the flow charts use the above values and calculate the
design margin (DM) in Block [l2[. Block [To] shows that the displacement effect
on the design margin (DM) has a magnitude of
+w, ,,. — ,
 +
Xx S1 *\ v"!' = (0.0042) (1.64)
= 0.0998 for P.- = 10"4
and Block jll shows that the long-term ionization effect on DM has a magni-
tude of
_
X2 S2
Ai + 1.28\ /
 + ±i28
\ ' C°.-°134) (2> ' V^"
= 0.226
If this type of transistor had a minimum initial gain of 50 at Ip = 1 mA
and Vp_ = 5 volts and the design limit was set at a minimum gain of 10
then
1 \
FE/TL
ALJL- = _L_ - _L_ = 0.08\hT,T, I 1Q 5Q
By comparing the design limit of 0.08 for A l/hpE with the two values
obtained above (for displacement and ionization effects), it is observed
that each effect will cause DM to be < 1 but that the long-term ioni-
zation effect is more than twice as much as the displacement effect.
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From this example, several conclusions can be drawn about the use
of 2N2222 transistors in the system.
1. Procurement of 2N2222 transistors using class R-C
is not possible.
2. Both displacement effects and long-term ionization
effects will be a problem but the long-term ionization
effects are more severe.
3. Limiting the procurement to one manufacturer will not
on its own necessarily provide a viable approach to
obtaining a tighter distribution in radiation hardness.
The above example uses a parameter distribution at a particular
radiation level. For this type of calculation the positive power on the
standard deviation "S" should be used.
If, as in the case of some digital device parameters, a variation
in parameter cannot be obtained, then another approach can be used. This
approach considers the distribution of failures (of a parameter) versus
radiation level. Data in this form can also be obtained from the Harry
Diamond Lab data bank. A mean and standard deviation of failures in terms
of radiation levels will then be used in the same log-normal formulas de-
rived above with the final comparison in Block ^ jmade with the fluence
and dose radiation limits set for the component. For this kind of approach,
a negative power on the standard deviation must be used. If, in this kind
of approach, 100% failures are found between two test points with no in-
dication of the distribution, use S=1.5 for displacement and S = 2
for long-term ionization.
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